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JUSTICE SCALIA: STANDING, ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW, AND THE SUPREME COURT 
Michael A. Perino* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
President Reagan's appointment of Antonin Scalia to the United 
States Supreme Court raises concern among liberals that Justice 
Scalia will help lead the Court away from a number of liberal posi-
tions toward a new conservatism. l The Reagan Administration's 
requirement that judicial appointments advance the Administration's 
preference for judicial restraint and strict constructionism enhances 
this concern. 2 These new executive requirements mean that federal 
courts should accord greater authority to the democratically elected 
branches of the government. 3 Justice Scalia's primary areas of study, 
administrative law and separation of powers, reflect his adherence 
to judicial self-restraint. 4 
One aspect of administrative law and separation of powers that 
could have a great negative influence on environmental litigation is 
the doctrine of standing, especially as standing relates to obtaining 
judicial review of administrative decisions. Scalia has advocated a 
position on standing that could severely limit the ability of litigants 
to obtain judicial review where they allege an environmental injury. 
* Executive Editor, 1987-1988, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW RE-
VIEW. 
1 See Chapple & Kraus, Rehnquist-Scalia Combined Effect May Far Exceed Current Pre-
dictions, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 15, 1986, at 24, col. 1. 
2 See Chief Justice Burger to Retire From Supreme Court; Reagan Nominates Rehnquist 
as Successor, Scalia to Fill Vacancy, 17 Env't Rep. (BNA) at 217 (June 6, 1986). See also 
Boyd, Bork Picked for High Court; Reagan Cites his 'Restraint'; Confirmation Fight Looms, 
N.Y. Times, July 2, 1987, at 1, col. 6. 
3 See R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 208 (1985). 
4 See Two Nominees, One Philosophy, Nat'l L.J., June 6, 1986, at 15, col. 1. 
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This Comment focuses on the possibility that Scalia will be able 
to erect a stricter standing doctrine inimical to environmental inter-
ests. Section II examines the doctrine of standing and the favored 
position that courts have granted environmental litigants. In Section 
III, this Comment discusses how Scalia, at least theoretically, is 
opposed to such a favored position for environmental litigants. Sec-
tion IV analyzes Scalia's position on standing as manifested in his 
opinions on the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. Finally, this 
Comment concludes by discussing how these factors, combined with 
Scalia's philosophy of judicial self-restraint, illuminate the possible 
position Scalia will take in environmental cases that come before the 
Supreme Court. 
The overall purpose of this Comment is to examine both Scalia's 
theoretical writings and his judicial opinions to explore how the 
practicalities of judicial decisionmaking have modified Scalia's schol-
arly positions. In this manner, the Comment explores the tensions 
inherent between the twin roles of scholar and jurist. In conjunction 
with this analysis, this Comment also examines how Scalia is still 
able to advance his theoretical and philosophical beliefs concerning 
judicial self-restraint. In this way, this Comment highlights what 
factors go into Scalia's decisionmaking. This Comment thus provides 
a framework for analyzing how Scalia will approach particular cases 
that come before the Supreme Court. 
II. THE DOCTRINE OF STANDING 
Standing concerns whether a plaintiff has a sufficient stake in an 
otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that 
controversy.5 Standing focuses primarily on the party seeking access 
to the courts and only secondarily on the issues that party seeks to 
adjudicate. 6 The doctrine of standing derives from article III of the 
Constitution, which restricts courts to hearing only cases or contro-
versies. 7 Typically, the question becomes whether the dispute sought 
to be litigated "will be presented in an adversary context and in a 
form historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution."8 Courts 
reason that, unless these requirements are met, the issues will not 
5 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731--32 (1972). 
6 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968). 
7 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. See G. ROBINSON, E. GELLHORN & H. BRUFF, THE ADMINIS-
TRATIVE PROCESS 207 (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter ROBINSON]. 
8 Flast, 392 U.S. at 101. 
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be presented with the necessary adverseness that illuminates and 
sharpens difficult constitutional issues. 9 
Although seemingly simple on its face, the doctrine of standing 
has been described as "among the most amorphous in the entire 
domain of public law. "10 Standing has been subject to widespread 
scholarly criticism. 11 This criticism focuses on the erratic manner in 
which the Supreme Court has applied the doctrine. 12 A number of 
commentators argue that the primary reason for the Court's incon-
sistent application of the standing doctrine is its willingness to let 
its view of the merits dictate the result it reaches on the standing 
issue. 13 In other words, the Supreme Court uses standing to achieve 
a number of jurisprudential and functional goals that go beyond the 
threshold question of the plaintiff's ability to have particular issues 
heard. 14 In this manner, the Court has used standing: (1) to avoid 
deciding issues it does not want to decide; (2) to allow the Court to 
decide issues it wants to decide; (3) to avoid deciding issues that it 
believes other branches of government should decide; (4) to reflect 
the subjective values the Court assigns to various constitutional and 
statutory rights; and (5) to avoid deciding cases where the plaintiff's 
claim has little merit. 15 Such decisionmaking falls under the rubric 
9 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). 
10 J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 69 (1986) (quoting Hearings 
on S.2097 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, 498 (1966)). 
11 Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate Surrogate for 
Claim for Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425 (1974); Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is it 
a Constitutional Requirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816 (1969); Currie, Misunderstanding Standing, 
1981 SUP. CT. REV. 41; Nichol, Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U. 
PA. L. REV. 635 (1985); Nichol, Causation as a Standing Requirement: The Unprincipled 
Use of Judicial Restraint, 69 Ky. L.J. 185 (1980-81); Nichol, Rethinking Standing, 72 CALIF. 
L. REV. 68 (1984); Sax, Standing to Sue: A Critical Review of the Mineral King Decision, 13 
NAT. RESOURCES J. 76 (1973); Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A Functional Analysis, 
86 HARV. L. REV. 645 (1973); Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 
88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1723-47 (1975). 
12 E.g., Nichol, Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v. Wright, supra note 11, at 635. 
13 L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 100 (1985). 
14 See Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A Functional Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REV. 
645 (1973). See also Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the "Case 
or Controversy" Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297, 302 (1979) (arguing that there are three 
interrelated policies behind the case or controversy requirement: "the smooth allocation of 
power among courts over time; the unfairness of holding later litigants to an adverse judgment 
in which they may not have been properly represented; and the importance of placing control 
over political processes in the hands of the people most closely involved"). 
15 R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 143 (1985) 
[hereinafter PIERCE). See also L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 99-120 (1985); J. VINING, 
LEGAL IDENTITY 10 (1978) (referring to this use of standing as "Machiavellian"). 
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of what can be termed "value-laden decisionmaking." Value-laden 
decisionmaking arises where judges allow their philosophic predil-
ictions to influence the results of their standing decisions. The result 
of this value-laden decisionmaking is a disjointed standing doctrine 
that erects unprincipled exceptions in certain types of cases and yet 
provides little barrier to litigation in others. 16 
The current standing doctrine is thus filled with permutations and 
inconsistencies that make any attempt at defining a general rule 
difficult.17 Despite this difficulty, it is possible to outline the frame-
work the Supreme Court uses to analyze standing issues in cases 
seeking judicial review of agency action generally, and specifically 
environmental cases. 
A. Standing to Obtain Judicial Review of Administrative Actions 
Courts analyze standing to challenge agency actions under the 
two-part approach adopted by the Supreme Court in Association of 
Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp. 18 Data Processing 
established the modern approach to standing issues. 19 In addition, 
Data Processing provided the analytical framework for two major 
shifts in the modern standing doctrine: a continued trend toward an 
increased liberality of application,20 and a concentration on the plain-
tiff's claimed injury. 21 
Data Processing concerned a suit by petitioners, who provided 
data processing services to businesses, challenging a ruling by the 
Comptroller of the Currency permitting banks to make data pro-
16 L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 100 (1985). 
17 For a fuller discussion of standing to sue, see 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREA-
TISE §§ 24:1-24:36 (2d ed. 1983); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 79-114 (1978). 
18 397 U.S. 150 (1970). 
19 L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 79-80 (1978). 
20 Scott, Standing to Sue in the Supreme Court-A Functional Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REV. 
645, 646 (1973). Data Processing was a continuation of the increasingly liberal application of 
the standing doctrine begun by the Supreme Court two years earlier in Flast v. Cohen, 392 
U.S. 83 (1968). Since Data Processing, however, the Burger Court has backed away from the 
extreme liberal approach of Flast and Data Processing. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 
(1984); Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans 
United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982). Despite this retrench-
ment, it is still accurate to refer to the liberalized standing doctrine since standing is still 
more liberally applied than in the pre-Flast era. Moreover, standing in environmental cases 
has not been subject to the same retrenchment as cases in other areas. See infra text 
accompanying notes 69-104. 
21 See PIERCE, supra note 15, at 142. 
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cessing services available to other banks and bank customers.22 In 
holding that the petitioners had standing, the Supreme Court stated 
that "[t]he first question is whether the plaintiff alleges that the 
challenged action has caused him injury in fact, economic or other-
wise,"23 and the second question is "whether the interest sought to 
be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of 
interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional 
guarantee in question. "24 
The Data Processing Court indicated that the first part of the 
test, injury in fact, arises from the "case or controversy" require-
ment of article III of the Constitution.25 Given this basis in article 
III, the Court viewed injury in fact as a limitation that keeps the 
judiciary from becoming involved in the process of making and im-
plementing laws. 26 By ensuring that the judiciary can only decide 
actual disputes, courts will thus be kept out of debates concerning 
the best policy the government should follow on a particular prob-
lem. 27 Accordingly, judges often state that standing limitations are 
necessary to prevent a government by the judiciary.28 
In Data Processing, the Court found that the injury sufficient to 
confer standing was the possibility that competition from national 
banks in the business of providing data processing services might 
entail some future loss of profits for the petitioners.29 Because two 
different parties caused those injuries, the data processors had 
standing to sue both. First, the data processing company had stand-
ing to sue the bank because the data processing association alleged 
that the bank was preparing to take some of their customers. 30 
Second, the Court found that the Comptroller had also caused peti-
tioners' injury because the Comptroller's ruling precipitated the 
above injury. 31 
Implicitly, the Court found injury where the harm had not yet 
occurred. 32 While the Comptroller had given banks permission to 
22 Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 151. The District Court dismissed the complaint for lack of 
standing and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Id. 
23 I d. at 152. 
24 I d. at 153. 
25 Id. at 151-52 (analyzing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2). 
26 See PIERCE, supra note 15, at 141. 
'n Id. at 141-42. 
28 See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188-92 (1974) (Powell, J., concur-
ring). 
29 Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 152. 
30 Id. 
31Id. 
32 See id. 
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compete with the data processors, the data processors had not yet 
lost any profits or customers.33 Thus, the data processors sustained 
a sufficient injury in fact without any actual deleterious effects on 
their business. 34 In a sense, this decision transformed a court's stand-
ing analysis from a decision about legally sufficient injuries suffered 
into a decision concerning the likelihood that an injury will indeed 
occur. The acceptance of such contemplated injuries is consistent 
with the trend toward judicial acceptance of more tenuous injuries 
as sufficient to invoke standing. 35 Data Processing thus helped move 
the Court toward a more liberal application of the standing require-
ments. 36 
In later decisions, the Court specified the requirements for injury 
in fact. 37 This specification is symptomatic of the increasing focus on 
the injury in fact portion of the Data Processing test. The Court's 
later decisions required: (1) that the litigants show that they have 
suffered personally some actual or threatened injury;38 (2) that the 
injury must be fairly traceable to the alleged illegal conduct of the 
defendant;39 and (3) that the injury must likely be redressed by a 
favorable decision. 40 The Court has thus specifically delineated what 
is required for injury in fact while leaving zone of interest an amor-
33 See id. 
34 See id. 
35 Compare Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 478-79 (1938) (personal or economic 
interest is insufficient; standing requires a plaintiff to show that a legal right has been invaded) 
with Federal Communications Comm'n v. Sander Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 476-77 
(1940) (statutory language granting judicial review to "persons aggrieved" by a FCC license 
decision included competitors facing potential economic injury from the agency's action). 
36 See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978) 
(environmental groups and individuals who lived near sites of proposed nuclear power plants 
had standing to challenge Price-Anderson Act's limitation of liability in case of a nuclear 
accident to $560 million as an unconstitutional taking); United States v. Students Challenging 
Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973) (group of law students had 
standing to challenge Interstate Commerce Commission's approval of railroad surcharge for 
transporting scrap materials because it damaged the air they breathed). 
37 See infra notes 38-41. 
38 Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979) (individual respondents 
had standing al'< testers to prove that petitioner's discriminatory steering practices documented 
by their testing deprived them, as residents of the adversely affected area, of the social and 
professional benefits of living in an integrated society). 
39 See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 504 (1975) (petitioners did not have standing because 
they were unable to show that their inability to purchase housing was due to town's restrictive 
zoning practices). 
40 Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976) (indigent petitioners 
did not have standing because they were unable to show that removal of favorable tax 
treatment for hospitals which refused to serve the indigent would result in the availability of 
such services from those hospitals). 
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phous and unrefined concept. The Supreme Court has referred to 
the injury in fact standards as the "irreducible minimum" required 
by the Constitution. 41 
In addition to this "irreducible minimum" the Court applies a set 
of discretionary factors--ciesignated "prudential limitations." These 
limitations stem from separation of powers notions about when 
courts should or should not intervene in agency actions. 42 These 
limitations act as a self-checking device designed to keep the judi-
ciary from usurping functions properly left to other branches of 
government. One such prudential limitation is that the Court will 
not decide cases in which the harm is merely a "generalized griev-
ance" shared in substantially equal measure by all or by a large class 
of citizens. 43 For example, in Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to 
Stop the War, the respondents, an association of present and former 
members of the Armed Forces Reserve opposing United States 
involvement in Vietnam, brought a class action on behalf of all 
citizens of the United States. 44 They were challenging the Reserve 
membership of Congressmen as violating the Incompatibility Clause 
of the Constitution. 45 In Schlesinger, the Supreme Court held that 
respondents had no standing to sue as citizens since the claimed 
nonobservance of this clause implicates only a generalized interest 
of all citizens in constitutional governance and is thus merely an 
abstract injury.46 Therefore, because the association did not show 
actual harm, there was no standing. 
The Supreme Court in Schlesinger reasoned that the generalized 
grievance limitation was necessary to keep the courts from deciding 
abstract questions of wide public significance where other govern-
mental institutions were more competent to address the questions 
and where judicial intervention was unnecessary to protect individ-
ual rights. 47 The Court imposed these limits to keep the judiciary 
within their predetermined constitutional role. 48 The problem with 
41 Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982). 
42 See ROBINSON, supra note 7, at 210. 
43 Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 216-27 (1974). 
44 [d. at 210-11 & n.!. 
45 [d. at 210-11 (The Incompatibility Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2, states that "no 
Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a member of either House during 
his Continuance in Office."). 
46 Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 217. The respondents asserted that the nonobservance of the 
clause deprived citizens of the faithful discharge of the legislative duties of reservist members 
of Congress. [d. 
47 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 499-500. 
48 See ROBINSON, supra note 7, at 207. 
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these "prudential limitations," however, is that they require judges 
to examine closely the underlying claims, or merits, of a case. Such 
an in-depth look necessarily focuses the judge's attention on his view 
of the claim's validity rather than merely the plaintiff's ability to 
assert the claim. This is a further reason why the courts have 
reached such widely inconsistent, value-laden results in standing 
cases. 49 
The second part of the Data Processing test, the "zone of interest" 
test, is statutory. 50 This part refers to whether Congress intended 
to allow parties in plaintiff's situation to obtain judicial review. 51 
This second step has lost much of its vitality in recent years. Scholars 
generally consider the only important question in standing is 
whether an alleged injury is sufficient to invoke the court's jurisdic-
tion. 52 
This scholarly view of the zone of interests test is based on the 
broad reading usually given to congressional intent. Courts read the 
"zone of interest" test as recognizing that it is within congressional 
discretion, as a matter of policy, to decide who may obtain review 
of agency actions. 53 In interpreting a statute under which an agency 
operates, courts tend to enlarge the class of people who may protest 
an administrative action. 54 This expansive interpretation removes a 
court's self-imposed "prudential limitations" and limits judicial in-
quiry to the question of injury in fact. 55 The test thus acknowledges 
that Congress can expand the scope of standing up to the constitu-
tional limits. 56 If most congressional grants expand standing up to 
49 Compare United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures 
(SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 687-88 (1973) (group had standing to sue because of injury to the air 
they breathed) with Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 616-19 (1973) (mother of 
illegitimate child denied standing to challenge child support statute that is enforced only in 
favor of legitimate children). 
50 [d. at 153. 
51 See id. 
52 See 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 24:17 (1983); see also Davis, The 
Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 450 (1970); Stewart, The Reformation of 
Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1723-47 (1975). This view is supported by the 
recently decided Clarke v. Securities Industry Ass'n, 107 S. Ct. 750 (1987), where the Supreme 
Court gave a very liberal reading to the "zone of interests" test. Scalia recused himself from 
the case, id. at 762, because he had participated in the case on the District of Columbia Court 
of Appeals and had dissented from that court's finding of standing. See Securities Industry 
Ass'n v. Comptroller of the Currency, 758 F.2d 739, 740 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
53 PIERCE, supra note 15, at 142. 
54 Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 154. 
65 See Warth, 422 U.S. at 501. 
56 See C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 3531.13 (1984). Examples of such congressional augmentation are numerous, especially in 
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the constitutional limits, then the only question that need be an-
swered is whether a sufficient injury in fact exists. 
The "zone of interests" test remains important, however, in the 
field of administrative law because it concerns the grant of judicial 
review contained in the Administrative Procedure Act (AP A).57 The 
AP A was enacted to establish minimum procedural rules for agencies 
and to erect a framework for judicial review of agency decisions. 58 
On the subject of judicial review, the APA provides that "[a] person 
suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected 
or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant 
statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof."59 Although different 
commentators interpret this provision in a number of ways,60 the 
general understanding, at the time of its passage, was that the 
provision codified the existing legal interest test61 and also referred 
to various statutory standing formulae ("adversely affected or ag-
grieved ... within the meaning of a relevant statute"). 62 
The Court's decision in Data Processing, however, expanded that 
narrow reading63 to include all interests potentially affected by 
agency actions taken pursuant to a statute. 64 The Supreme Court 
specifically rejected the Court of Appeals use of the "legal interest" 
test. 65 The Supreme Court found that the Comptroller's order allow-
ing banks to provide data processing services, standing alone, was 
sufficient to render the petitioner/data processing company "ag-
grieved" and thus capable of challenging the order. 66 Therefore, the 
the area of environmental interests. See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amend-
ments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1982); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1982). 
57 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982). 
58 See 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1.6 (1983). 
59 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982). 
60 Compare 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 24:3 (1983) with BREYER & 
STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 931 (1979). 
61 See Federal Communications Comm'n v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940). 
For a discussion of the legal interest test of standing, see J. VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY 20--33 
(1978). 
62 Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A Functional Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REV. 645, 
658 (1973). 
63 Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153-54. 
64 PIERCE, supra note 15, at 142. 
65 Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 152-53. The Court of Appeals had stated that: 
[AJ plaintiff may challenge alleged illegal competition when as a complainant it 
pursues (1) a legal interest by reason of public charter or contract, ... (2) a legal 
interest by reason of statutory protection, ... or (3) a "public interest" in which 
Congress has recognized the need for review of administrative action and plaintiff is 
significantly involved to have standing to represent the public. 
Association of Data Processing Service Orgs. v. Camp, 406 F.2d 837, 842-43 (8th Cir. 1969). 
66 Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 157. 
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"zone of interests" test apparently restricts almost nothing.67 The 
test has thus greatly liberalized standing requirements and focused 
both the Court's and the commentator's attention on the injury in 
fact requirement. 68 Both of these major shifts in standing, the gen-
eral increased liberality in its application, and the focus on injury in 
fact, have been most visible in environmental litigation. 
B. Standing in Environmental Litigation 
Standing in environmental litigation follows the same basic anal-
ysis used in all standing questions. 69 The major difference lies in the 
comparatively slight showing courts require for plaintiffs to obtain 
standing in cases involving environmental issues. 7o In each area of 
the standing analysis, the Supreme Court has been willing to lessen 
the typical standing requirements. Thus, in environmental cases, the 
Supreme Court has readily found a congressional grant of standing 
to displace its own prudential limitations concerning such factors as 
the widespread nature of the injury. Consequently, the favored po-
sition of environmental law in standing questions has greatly pro-
moted environmental interests and also helped to liberalize standing 
generally. 
1. Injury in Fact Requirement 
Deferential judicial behavior toward environmental litigation is 
evident from the relaxed injury in fact requirements in United States 
v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP). 71 
The plaintiffs in SCRAP were an unincorporated group of five law 
students who challenged an Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) 
approval of a railroad rate increase that placed a surcharge on the 
67 See 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 22:00 (1978). 
68 See, e.g., Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. 
Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 
U.S. 208 (1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); United States v. Students 
Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Sierra Club v. 
Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Nichol, Rethinking Standing, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 68 (1984); 
Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1734-
47 (1975). 
69 See supra text accompanying notes 5-68. 
70 Professor Rodgers has noted that "[iJn the space of a few years the question of standing 
in environmental litigation has shifted from a significant doctrinal barrier to a nettlesome 
technicality." W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 23 (1977). 
71 412 U.S. 669 (1973). 
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carrying of scrap materials. 72 The SCRAP plaintiffs asserted that 
this rate structure promoted the use of raw materials over recycled 
materials, thereby increasing pollution and injuring them as users 
of the natural environment and breathers of the country's air.73 The 
Court found that this was an injury sufficient to support SCRAP's 
suit under the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA).74 
SCRAP illustrates a number of the significant differences between 
standing in environmental law and standing in other litigation. First, 
in SCRAP, the Supreme Court was not disturbed by the widespread 
impact of the alleged injury.75 In fact, the Court specifically found 
that "all persons who utilize the scenic resources of the country, and 
indeed all who breathe its air, could claim harm similar to that 
alleged by the environmental groups here."76 The Court in SCRAP 
was not concerned with interfering in areas that should be left to 
the political branches of government under a system of separation 
of powers (in this case, Congress' properly delegated power to the 
EPA).77 
SCRAP also shows the Supreme Court's willingness to find a 
congressional grant of standing. 78 In an emphatic footnote, the Court 
dismissed any question of whether SCRAP's injury fell within the 
72 [d. at 678. The ICC approved a rate structure which placed a 2.5% surcharge on scrap 
materials thus contributing to the increased cost of using such materials. [d. at 676. 
73 The complete description of the Supreme Court's finding of SCRAP's injury in fact is as 
follows: 
It [SCRAP] claimed that each of its members "suffered economic, recreational and 
aesthetic harm directly as a result of the adverse environmental impact of the railroad 
freight structure, as modified by the Commission's actions to date in Ex Parte 281." 
Specifically, SCRAP alleged that each of its members was caused to pay more for 
finished products, that each of its members "[u]ses the forests, rivers, streams, 
mountains, and other natural resources surrounding the Washington Metropolitan 
area and at his legal residence, for camping, hiking, fishing, sightseeing, and other 
recreational [and] aesthetic purposes," and that these uses have been adversely 
affected by the increased freight rates, that each of its members breathes the air 
within the Washington metropolitan area and the area of his legal residence and that 
this air has suffered increased pollution caused by the modified rate structure, and 
that each member has been forced to pay increased taxes because of the sums which 
must be expended to dispose of otherwise reusable waste materials. 
[d. at 678. 
74 SCRAP alleged that the ICC decision to maintain the surcharge was unlawful because 
the ICC failed to include a detailed environmental impact statement as required by the 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2)(c). SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 679. 
75 SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 687. 
76 [d. (emphasis added). 
77 But see Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984); Logan, Standing to Sue: A Proposed 
Separation of Powers Analysis, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 37; Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as 
an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 881 (1983). 
78 SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 686 n.13. 
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"zone of interests" of NEPA.79 Thus, SCRAP illustrates the Court's 
readiness to accept a small injury as sufficient to confer standing in 
environmental cases.80 
2. Causation Requirement 
The Court has also shown a willingness to de-emphasize the cau-
sation element of standing for environmental litigation.81 In Duke 
Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc.,82 the 
plaintiffs, two environmental groups and 40 individuals who lived 
near the sites of two proposed nuclear power plants, challenged the 
Price-Anderson Act's constitutionality.83 Plaintiffs claimed that the 
Act, which limits liability in the case of a nuclear accident to $560 
million, deprived them of their property rights without due process 
of law, because they could not obtain full compensation if there were 
a nuclear accident. 84 
In Duke, the Court found an actual injury in two effects of the 
nuclear plants' operation: (1) the environmental and aesthetic con-
sequences of the thermal pollution of two lakes in the vicinity of the 
disputed plants; and (2) the emission of non-natural radiation. 85 The 
Court based this second finding on the "generalized concern about 
exposure to radiation and the apprehension flowing from the uncer-
tainty about the health and genetic consequences of even small emis-
sions like those concededly emitted by nuclear power plants. "86 What 
makes this finding interesting, beyond the very slight and somewhat 
speculative harm involved, is that there appears to be no close 
relation, or "nexus,"87 between the injury supporting standing and 
the claimed violation of the due process clause of the fifth amend-
79 The Court stated that "[i]t is undisputed that the 'environmental interest' that the ap-
pellees seek to protect is within the interests to be protected by NEPA .... " Id. at 686 n.13. 
80 The difference can be seen by comparing the results in SCRAP with Warth v. Seldin, 
422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975). In Warth, the majority, in denying standing to various groups and 
nonresident individuals to challenge zoning practices that allegedly excluded low income 
residents, held "that a plaintiff who seeks to challenge exclusionary zoning practices must 
allege specific, concrete facts demonstrating that the challenged practices harm him, and that 
he personally would benefit in a tangible way from the court's intervention." Id. 
81 For a discussion of the causation element, see Warth, 422 U.S. at 504-08. 
82 438 U.S. 59 (1978). 
83 Id. at 66-67 (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1970 ed., Supp. V». 
84 Duke, 438 U.S. at 69. Obviously, plaintiffs could only be deprived of their property if an 
accident occurred with the resulting damages in excess of the statutory ceiling. The record 
indicated that the chances of this were slight. 
85 Id. at 73-74. 
86 Id. at 74. 
87 See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968). 
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ment. 88 In previous cases, the Supreme Court had required plaintiffs 
to show a "logical nexus between the status asserted and the claim 
sought to be adjudicated. "89 Consequently, it was insufficient for 
plaintiffs to show that they were injured by the defendant's acts. 
The plaintiffs also had to show that the defendant violated some duty 
owed to the plaintiff.90 Thus, the nexus requirement is equivalent to 
the zone of interests test91 because both the recognition of a duty 
toward the plaintiff and a specific statutory prohibition are intended 
to protect citizens from a recognizable harm. 92 Under a nexus anal-
ysis, a court's finding of an environmental injury could not, absent 
the most extreme circumstances, be the basis of a fifth amendment 
claim. 
To grant standing, and thus decide on the merits, the Duke Court 
was willing to limit the formerly pervasive nexus requirement to 
cases of taxpayer standing and cases concerning the rights of third 
parties. 93 Consequently, the Court found an environmental injury to 
be an injury sufficient to support a claim under the fifth amend-
ment. 94 The Court was thus willing to manipulate the constitutional 
nexus requirement to reach the merits of an environmental case. 95 
In Duke, the Court was also willing to relax the requirement that 
the standing injury be "fairly traceable" to the challenged action of 
the defendant. 96 Traceability differs from nexus because traceability 
refers to the relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff 
while nexus refers to the relationship between the statute and the 
plaintiff. The Duke Court accepted the District Court's finding that 
there was a substantial likelihood that Duke would not be able to 
complete the construction and maintain the operation of the nuclear 
plants but for the protection of the Price-Anderson Act. 97 In accept-
ing this finding, the Court rejected the defendant's argument that 
the plants would be built even without the Price-Anderson limita-
tions and, thus, the Act was not the "but for" cause of the disputed 
88 u.s. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law"). 
89 Flast, 392 U.S. at 102. 
90 L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 98 (1978). 
91 See supra text accompanying notes 50-68. 
92 Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153-55 (1970). 
93 Duke, 438 U.S. at 78-81. 
94 ld. at 81. 
95 I d. at 78-81. 
96 ld. at 74-75. 
97 ld. at 74-75 (citing Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 431 F. 
Supp. 203, 220 (W.D.N.C. 1977)). 
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power plants and their alleged adverse effects. 98 The basis for the 
defendant's argument was that if the Act had not been passed, 
Congress may have chosen to construct nuclear power plants as a 
government monopoly.99 The Court held that nothing in its past cases 
required a party to negate the kind of speculative and hypothetical 
possibilities suggested to demonstrate that judicial relief would be 
effective. 100 
Thus, in several of its decisions, the Supreme Court has been 
willing to lessen the requirements of standing for plaintiffs alleging 
environmental injuries. 101 In reducing the standing requirements, 
the Court has focused on the requirements of injury in fact, causa-
tion, and the relationship between the claimed injury and the statute 
or constitutional provision under which relief is sought.102 As a re-
sult, the Court has tended to discount the widespread nature of a 
particular injury103 and to find more readily a congressional grant of 
standing that displaces the Court's own prudential limitations. 104 
Jurists and legal scholars have long criticized the Supreme Court's 
practices regarding standing. 105 One notable critic is Justice Antonin 
Scalia who fundamentally disagrees with the Court's theory of stand-
ing. He enunciated this theory in a 1983 article106 in which he viewed 
standing as an essential element of the separation of powers. 
98 Duke, 438 U.S. at 77-78. 
99 Id. at 75. 
100 Id. at 78. This holding should be contrasted with the Court's holding in Warth v. Seldin, 
422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975); see supra note 79 for a discussion of Warth's requirements of 
specificity for showing a causal link between the act complained of and the alleged injury. 
A stricter application of the causation requirement is seen in Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 
U.S. 95 (1983). There, the defendant, Lyons, was stopped for a traffic violation by police who 
proceeded, allegedly without provocation, to seize him and to apply a chokehold that rendered 
him unconscious and damaged his larynx. Id. at 97-98. Lyons sought injunctive relief pre-
venting Los Angeles police from using the hold except in life-threatening situations. Id. at 
98. The Supreme Court held that Lyons had no standing. The Court ruled that, for Lyons to 
establish a causal link between the act complained of and the alleged injury, he would have 
to show that he would have another encounter with the police, that all police always choke 
any citizen with whom they happen to have an encounter, and that the city authorized the 
police to act in such a manner. Id. at 105-06. These examples show that the required causal 
link is much less in environmental litigation. 
101 See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978); 
United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 
669 (1973). 
102 See Duke, 438 U.S. at 72-81; SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 683-90. 
103 SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 687. 
104 Id. at 646 n.13. 
105 See articles cited supra note 11. 
106 Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 
17 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 881 (1983) [hereinafter Separation of Powers]. 
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III. JUSTICE SCALIA'S THEORY OF STANDING 
Scalia's disagreement with the Supreme Court's current standing 
doctrine goes to the heart of that doctrine.107 The Supreme Court 
has viewed the standing doctrine as having a constitutional core 
whose exact contours vary according to the prudential limitations 
set by the Court.108 Scalia, however, states that the existence of 
standing is largely within the control of Congress in that Congress 
can create individual legal rights that the judiciary must then en-
force.109 Whim Congress creates such a right, the courts must hear 
the case. 110 Prudential limitations come into effect where, for ex-
ample, Congress requires the executive to implement a general wel-
fare program for the benefit of the majority.lll In such cases, the 
prudential limitations act as a set of presumptions derived from the 
common law. These presumptions determine if a legal right exists. 112 
Congress can displace this latter inquiry by explicitly granting stand-
ing, provided that the grant does not provide standing when the 
constitutional requirement of particularized injury is not met. 113 
There is more to Scalia's dissatisfaction with the current standing 
doctrine, however, than a dispute over the internal workings of the 
Court's analysis of the standing doctrine. Scalia has also found fault 
with the Court's "readiness" to imply a congressional grant of stand-
ing in a particular statute where no explicit grant exists. 114 
The most important example of this "liberalization"1l5 of the stand-
ing doctrine appears in the current interpretation the Supreme Court 
has given the judicial review provisions of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act (APA).116 Scalia disputes the liberalized gloss placed on 
the AP A by the zone of interests test.117 He has read the AP A as 
107 Id. at 885. The next section is based mainly on Scalia's 1983 standing article. The purpose 
of relying primarily on Scalia's articles instead of his opinions on the District of Columbia 
Court of Appeals is to highlight the distinction between Scalia's pure theoretical perspective 
and the manner in which that perspective is put into practice. The tensions inherent between 
Justice Scalia's twin roles of scholar and jurist could modify his practical approach to juris-
prudential problems during his tenure on the Supreme Court. 
108 See supra text accompanying notes 5-49. 
109 Separation of Powers, supra note 106, at 885. 
l1°Id. 
III I d. at 886. 
112 Id. 
113Id. 
114Id. 
115Id. at 887. 
116 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982). 
117 Separation of Powers, supra note 106, at 888-89 (citing Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 
154--55). See supra text accompanying notes 63-68. 
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only granting standing where there was a previously recognized legal 
wrong or where there was a specific congressional grant of stand-
ing. 118 In short, although Scalia has agreed that Congress has the 
ability to displace the courts' prudential limitations,119 he has said 
that the Court has found such displacements where Congress never 
intended them.120 Thus, for Scalia, the Supreme Court's behavior 
has "transmorgrified" already liberalized grants of standing "into an 
affirmative grant of standing in 'all situations in which a party who 
is in fact aggrieved seeks review, regardless of a lack of legal right 
or specific statutory language. "'121 
The gist of Scalia's disagreement with the present standing doc-
trine concerns the change in the judiciary's role resulting from these 
new liberalized rules of standing. 122 Standing, for Scalia, functions 
to restrict courts to their traditional role of protecting individuals 
and minorities against what has customarily been termed the "tyr-
anny of the majority."123 Standing does this by ensuring that the 
plaintiff is either the object of the law's requirement or prohibition, 
or suffers some "concrete injury" as a direct result of that law. l24 It 
is in this manner that standing functions as a mechanism to maintain 
the separation of powers. 125 Such a view is consistent with the basic 
tenets of judicial restraint. These basic tenets seek to limit the role 
of the courts in relation to the other branches of government. 126 
This self-governing mechanism of standing operates on a number 
of different levels. Scalia starts from the premise that there are 
certain areas in which the courts should not be involved. 127 One such 
area is that of the political negotiation found within the rulemaking 
process of administrative law. 128 For Scalia, some agency decisions 
118 Separation of Powers, supra note 106, at 887. 
119 [d. at 886. 
120 [d. (citing Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 
608, 616 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966) (Federal Power Act provision of 
right to review for aggrieved parties held to give standing to those who by their activities 
and conduct have exhibited a special interest in the aesthetic, conservational, and recreational 
aspects of power development». 
121 Separation of Powers, supra note 106, at 889 (citing Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. 
Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1970». 
122 Separation of Powers, supra note 106, at 890-93. 
123 [d. at 894. 
124 [d. at 894-95. 
125 [d. at 890-93. This view is not without support. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984). 
See also, Logan, Standing to Sue: A Proposed Separation of Powers Analysis, 1984 WIS. L. 
REV. 37. 
126 Posner, The Meaning of Judicial Self-Restraint, 59 IND. L.J. 1, 11-12 (1983). 
127 See Separation of Powers, supra note 106, at 889. 
128 Scalia, Rulemaking as Politics, 34 ADMIN. L. REV. v, v (1982). 
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are made merely because they are what the majority wants, at least 
as those wants are reflected in the political processes, and are not 
necessarily based on any other rational explanation. 129 Standing, 
according to Scalia, should function to insure that the courts are not 
able to alter this type of political decisionmaking. As Scalia explains 
this function: 
The doctrine of standing ... was almost tailor-made to protect 
political discretion. It is rudimentary political science that slight 
harm, expense or inconvenience imposed on a large, diffuse body 
of the population will generally not arouse effective political 
opposition. But diffuseness, expansiveness, lack of particularity 
was what the doctrine of standing was all about. In other words, 
it excluded from the courts precisely those interests that were 
likely to lose in a rulemaking proceeding with substantial political 
content-the potential hikers and campers who would be harmed 
by construction of a new ski resort, to take a real life example. 130 
Scalia therefore has concluded that the trend of judicial and legis-
lative liberalization of standing has removed the barriers that confine 
the courts to protecting only minority rights. 131 
Scalia has contended that another reason for the courts to stay 
out of these "majoritarian" processes is the judiciary's inability to 
promote majority interests. 132 For Scalia, the judiciary, because of 
their training, typically upper-middle class background, and unac-
countability tend to not do "what is good for the people" but instead 
tend to enforce the political prejudices of their own class. 133 Scalia 
gives the following example of this type of behavior: 
Their greatest success in such an enterprise-ensuring strict 
enforcement of the environmental laws, not to protect particular 
minorities but for the benefit of all the people-met with ap-
proval in the classrooms of Cambridge and New Haven, but not 
in the factories of Detroit and the mines of West Virginia. It 
may well be, of course, that the judges know what is good for 
the people better than the people themselves; or that democracy 
simply does not permit the genuine desires of the people to be 
given effect; but those are not the premises under which our 
system operates. 134 
129 Id. at v-vi. 
130Id. at vi (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972». 
131 See Separation of Powers, supra note 106, at 892-93. 
132 I d. at 896. 
133 Id. See also, B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 174-75 (1921) ("The 
spirit of the age, as it is revealed to each of us, is too often only the spirit of the group in 
which the accidents of birth or education or occupation or fellowship have given us a place"). 
134 Separation of Powers, supra note 106, at 897. 
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Thus, according to Scalia, even if judges are correct, they should 
only become involved in assuring the regularity of agency action 
when such assurance is incidental to deciding the rights of individ-
uals. 135 It is not the courts' duty "to see that important legislative 
purposes, heralded in the halls of Congress, are not lost or misdi-
rected in the vast hallways of the federal bureaucracy. "136 On the 
contrary, Scalia has viewed the executive branch's ability to lose or 
misdirect laws as a prime component of social change, and thus any 
judicial attempts to prevent this are "profoundly conservative. "137 
In short, the traditional function of standing has been to enforce 
the separation of powers by ensuring that the courts are not con-
verted into a forum for political debate, open to all, to address any 
issue. 138 By excluding all persons from bringing a particular issue 
before the court, lack of standing thus necessarily excludes that issue 
from judicial resolution. 139 Therefore, Scalia has supported this tra-
ditional function of standing. He has viewed standing as a tool of 
judicial self-restraint because its usefulness arises from its ability to 
limit the power of the courts. 
For Scalia, the key to standing's function of enforcing separation 
of powers arises from the necessity of a concrete injury. 140 A concrete 
injury is an essential requirement according to Scalia because it 
separates the injured party from all others who claim a benefit from 
the social contract.141 The social contract refers only to the basic 
philosophical idea that society formed as a mutually advantageous 
cooperative venture with rules that restrict liberty in such a way as 
to yield advantages for all. 142 Many commentators have viewed the 
social contract as encompassing only the provision and allocation of 
135 [d. at 884 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803)). 
136 Separation of Powers, supra note 106, at 884 (quoting Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm., 
Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1971)). Calvert Cliffs held, in 
part, that the courts have the power to require agencies to comply with procedural directions 
of National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. 449 F.2d at 1114-15. 
137 Separation of Powers, supra note 106, "at 897. This substitution of a normally conceived 
conservative viewpoint with a normally conceived liberal viewpoint is a common rhetorical 
device employed by Justice Scalia. For an interesting discussion of the way in which judges 
employ language see Weisberg, How Judges Speak: Some Lessons on Adjudication in Billy 
Budd, Sailor With an Application to Justice Rehnquist, 57 N. Y. U. L. REV. 1 (1982). 
138 See Separation of Powers, supra note 106, at 892. 
139 [d. 
140 [d. at 895. 
141 [d. 
142 J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 112 (1971). See generally J. ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL 
CONTRACT (1762); J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT (1714). 
1987] JUSTICE SCALIA 153 
material advantages. 143 Therefore, according to these commentators, 
injury in fact limits governmental control to the terms of the social 
contract by ensuring that the courts cannot enforce particular ideo-
logical preferences. Because, however, the concrete injury is a vio-
lation of the terms of the social contract, the injured party is entitled 
to special protection from the democratic manner in which social-
contractual affairs are normally handled. 144 This special protection 
is, of course, the province of the courts. 
Scalia has also stated, however, that although necessary, concrete 
injury in and of itself is not enough for standing; the plaintiff must 
also establish minority status relevant to the particular government 
transaction from which the alleged injury arose. 145 Therefore, ac-
cording to Scalia, not all concrete injuries would be capable of sup-
porting a congressional conferral of standing. 146 He has stated that 
there are injuries that are so widely shared that even a specific 
congressional provision protecting against that harm would not de-
fine a proper minority capable of invoking judicial protection. 147 As 
an example of such a widespread injury, Scalia has cited the Supreme 
Court's finding in SCRAp148 of an injury to all who breathe the 
143 For example, Professor Stewart explains the relationship between injury in fact and the 
social contract as follows: 
The ultimate ground of the "injury in fact" test reminiscent of the common law's 
focus on the protection of material interests, may be in the contractarian theory of 
government. Put simply the theory is this: the justification for government lies in 
individuals' willingness to assent to a scheme of mutual cooperation that increases 
individuals' opportunity to satisfy their preferences. Social action, when limited to 
the provision and allocation of material advantages, requires no general agreement 
on personal preferences or values. So long as only material interests are accorded 
protection by law, rules can be formulated which will enable each individual to pursue 
his own ends through a system of reciprocity that increases wealth, leisure, and the 
like, thus enlarging material opportunities for all. If ideological interests are accorded 
legal protections, however, two basic difficulties emerge. First, ideological interests 
... often have an all or nothing feature .... If several conflicting ideological inter-
ests are accorded recognition, or even one ideological interest that conflicts with 
material interests, it may be impossible to achieve stable compromise. Second, vin-
dication of a litigant's ideological preferences may require others to acknowledge 
principles which they reject. But such enforced orthodoxy is contrary to contractarian 
premises; an agreement to share the fruits of cooperative endeavor is not an under-
taking to embrace another's ideology. 
Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1739 
(1975) (citations omitted). 
144 Separation of Powers, supra note 106, at 895. 
145 [d. 
146 [d. 
147 [d. at 895-96. 
148 412 U.S. at 687. 
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country's air as the type of injury that should not be capable of 
supporting standing to sue. 149 It seems, therefore, that Scalia would 
shift consideration of the widespread nature of the injury from its 
place as a discretionary prudential consideration to a core require-
ment of article III. 150 
Accordingly, Scalia believes that the current dysfunctional state 
of the standing doctrine is directly related to the lessening of judicial 
focus on the requirement of a concrete, particularized injury that 
sets the claimant apart from the citizenry as a whole. 151 Scalia has 
contended that liberalization of standing has affected two great 
changes in the judicial system. 152 First, it has given courts the ability 
to address issues that were previously beyond the scope of their 
powers. 153 Second, the liberalized standing rules have also given 
courts the ability to address issues promptly at the behest of almost 
anyone. l54 The courts are thus now a key component of any public 
debate because of the prompt access that they afford to airing polit-
ical issues. 155 
This combination of breadth and immediacy of judicial review, 
Scalia has stated, has directly resulted in the "overjudicialization of 
the processes of self-governance. "156 Such a view represents Scalia's 
adherence to the philosophy of judicial self-restraint, which sets, as 
an important goal of judicial decisionmaking, the reduction in the 
power of the courts in relation to the other branches of govern-
ment. 157 A judge accomplishes this reduction by deferring to the 
decisions of Congress and the administrative agencies. 158 This defer-
ence can take one of two forms. First, a judge can defer to the merits 
of a case by finding that another branch of government has already 
decided the issue. 159 Alternatively, the judge can restrict the court's 
ability to decide issues by tightening up access to judicial review by 
strict enforcement of procedural rules. Scalia's entire theory of 
standing can thus be seen as an embodiment of this second method 
of judicial self-restraint. Scalia seeks to trim the power of the courts 
149 Separation of Powers, supra note 106, at 896. 
150 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
151 Separation of Powers, supra note 106, at 881-82. 
152 See id. at 892-93. 
153 [d. at 892. 
154 [d. at 892-93. 
155 [d. at 893. 
156 [d. at 881. 
157 See R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 208 (1985). 
158 [d. 
159 See id. 
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by limiting the type of litigants, and therefore the type of issues, 
that the courts can hear. 
Scalia has suggested that this trimming of the courts' power 
through standing can be accomplished in three ways.160 First, the 
courts should strictly adhere to the requirement of a distinctive and 
particularized injury that distinguishes the plaintiff from the popu-
lation as a whole. 161 Second, the courts should refrain from discerning 
broad congressional grants of standing unless such grants are ex-
plicit. 162 Even with an explicit grant, however, the courts must 
insure that legislative conferrals of standing do not infringe upon 
the constitutional core requirement of a concrete and particularized 
injury.l63 Finally, the judiciary must recognize the original meaning 
and intent of the APA's definitional phrase "adversely affected or 
aggrieved within the meaning of a relevant statute" to insure that 
standing is not expanded any further. 164 
Functionally, Scalia has viewed standing as a constraint on the 
judiciary's ability to usurp the functions of the other branches of 
government. His theory thus stresses the limited nature of the 
courts' role in solving societal problems. For Scalia, judicial deci-
sionmaking is only proper and useful to protect a minority interest 
that would lose in the democratic processes. Where, however, an 
injury or burden is dispersed over most or all of the population, 
Scalia's position has been that it is impracticable that all should be 
able to directly voice their concern by resort to the judiciary.165 In 
a complex society, such rights are protected by the people's power 
over the elected official, or as Scalia would say, the democratic 
processes. 166 
Scalia's espoused standing theory could have a great impact on 
standing to sue in environmental litigation. Where the harm is wide-
spread and individually minimal, as in many environmental cases, it 
160 Separation of Powers, supra note 106, at 897-99. 
161 See id. at 898. 
162 See id. 
163 See id. at 896. 
164 See id. at 898-99. 
165 This theory is analogous to Justice Holmes' analysis in Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. 
State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915), of when a hearing was necessary to meet the 
requirements of due process. In that case, Holmes held that a hearing was only required 
where government action affected a relatively small number of persons in an exceptional 
manner and in each case upon individual grounds. Id. at 446. This concept is akin to Scalia's 
requirement of a concrete injury that sets the plaintiff apart from the population as a whole. 
See Separation of Powers, supra note 106, at 894-95. Both Holmes' construction and Scalia's 
theory of standing recognize a limited applicability and utility for judicial-type resolutions. 
166 Separation of Powers, supra note 106, at 896. 
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may be impossible to find someone who is sufficiently and specifically 
harmed to satisfy Scalia's high threshold of injury in fact. This is 
one reason why environmental law, as both a main beneficiary of, 
and the main driving force behind the liberalized standing trend, 167 
could suffer from a Scaliaesque standing doctrine. 
The obvious disdain that Scalia shows for the grants of standing 
in environmental cases168 should raise concern among environmen-
talists as to whether he will be instrumental in restricting future 
access to the courts for environmental plaintiffs. Further, in a 1984 
decision, the Supreme Court denied standing to parents of black 
school children who alleged that the Internal Revenue Service had 
not adopted sufficient standards to deny tax-exempt status to racially 
discriminating private schools. 169 The Court held that requirements 
of standing are to be interpreted in reference to separation of powers 
principles. 170 Although Scalia was not on the Court when that opinion 
was written, such an analysis echoes Scalia's own theoretical base 
and thus indicates that he might have some support on the Supreme 
Court for restricting judicial review.171 Finally, at least one com-
mentator has noted a conservative trend in recent Supreme Court 
environmental law decisions172 decided before Scalia joined the 
Court. This trend could be augmented by the addition of the judi-
cially conservative Scalia. It is instructive to focus on these concerns 
through an analysis of Scalia's standing theory during his tenure on 
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. From this foundation in 
Scalia's judicial opinions, it will be possible to explore his potential 
effect on future environmental litigation. 
IV. JUSTICE SCALIA AND STANDING: PRACTICAL ApPLICATION OF 
HIS THEORY 
During his term on the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 
Justice Scalia wrote a substantial number of opinions concerning 
167 See supra text accompanying notes 69-105. 
168 See supra text accompanying notes 130 & 134. 
169 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 739 (1984). 
170 I d. at 752. 
171 Of the Justices who made up the Allen majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, 
and Justice O'Connor are still on the Court. 
172 The Supreme Court and Environmental Law: A Whole New Ballgame?, 14 Envtl. L. 
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,262 (July, 1984). 
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standing. 173 The large number alone indicates the doctrine's impor-
tance to Scalia and his use of that doctrine to enforce his policy of 
judicial restraint. Although Scalia's tenure on the Court of Appeals 
was too short to draw any definite conclusions concerning trends 
that may have developed over time, it is safe to say that Scalia's 
early standing opinions adhered much more closely to his theoretical 
base than his more recent opinions. 174 Such time-based factors, how-
ever, only partially reveal what appears to be a trend away from 
Scalia's own doctrinal theory of standing. Four exemplary cases will 
serve to illustrate these changes. These decisions, despite the move 
away from his theoretical stance, still indicate that Scalia may not 
be favorably disposed to most environmental interests. The reason 
for this position, however, is not that he is anti-environmental, but 
rather because such a position is a necessary adjunct of his main 
policy of judicial self-restraint. In other words, Scalia's decisions in 
173 Scalia sat on the District of Columbia Court of Appeals from 1982 until his appointment 
to the Supreme Court in 1986. He wrote eighteen opinions on the issue of standing. Aluminum 
Co. of America v. United States, 790 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Block v. Meese, 793 F.2d 
1303 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Center for Auto Safety v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 
793 F.2d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Scalia, J., dissenting); In re Center for Auto Safety, 793 F.2d 
1346 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Thomas v. New York, 802 F.2d 1443 (D.C. Cir. 
1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3196 (1987) (Scalia, J., took no part in the consideration of the 
petitions for certiorari); Regular Common Carrier Conference v. United States, 793 F.2d 376 
(D.C. Cir. 1986); FAIC Securities, Inc. v. United States, 768 F.2d 352 (D.C. Cir. 1985); 
Securities Industry Ass'n v. Comptroller of the Currency, 758 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (per 
curiam, Scalia, J., dissenting from the court's finding of standing), a/I'd in part rev'd in part, 
107 S. Ct. 750 (1987) (Court affirmed grant of standing but reversed on the merits; Scalia, J., 
took no part in the consideration of the case); Center for Auto Safety v. Ruckelshaus, 747 
F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1984); New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution v. Nuclear Regulatory 
Comm'n, 727 F.2d 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500 
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J., dissenting), vacated, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985); United Presbyterian 
Church in the U.S.A. v. Reagan, 738 F.2d 1375 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Community Nutrition 
Institute v. Block, 698 F.2d 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part), rev'd, 467 U.S. 340 (1984); National Coalition to Ban Handguns v. Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco & Firearms, 715 F.2d 632 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Safir v. Dole, 718 F.2d 475 (D.C. Cir. 
1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1206 (1984); Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Dole, 723 F.2d 975 (D.C. 
Cir 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984); Covelo Indian Community v. Watt, Nos. 82-2377, 
82-2417, slip op. (D.C. Cir. Dec. 21, 1982) (LEXIS, Genfed library, USAPP file) (per curiam, 
Scalia, J., dissenting). 
174 Such trends are uncertain for a number of reasons. First, there are no factually similar 
cases that occur in both his earlier and later years. Such a lack of "benchmarks" makes it 
difficult to discount other variables that may have influenced a particular decision. More 
importantly for our purposes, the cases which concern standing in environmental litigation 
came within Scalia's last year on the Court of Appeals, making it impossible to isolate any 
changes which are a function of his length of time on the bench. Consequently, this note will 
limit itself to discussing only the most broadly obvious time-based trends. 
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environmental litigation will not be dictated by whether he favors 
environmental interests, but by how the decision promotes his own 
judicial agenda. 
A. Covelo Indian Community v. Watt: Justice Scalia's Theory in 
Practice 
Scalia's earliest opinion on standing, Covelo Indian Community 
v. Watt,175 is a textbook example of his standing theory. In Covelo, 
Scalia dissented from the Court of Appeals' grant of standing to the 
plaintiffs, an Indian group who brought suit in federal district court 
seeking declaratory and mandatory injunctive relief for the Depart-
ment of the Interior's failure to act as required by federal statute. 176 
The statute required the Secretary of the Interior, after consultation 
with the Attorney General, to submit to Congress by December 31, 
1982, legislative proposals to resolve certain Indian claims that the 
Secretary and Attorney General felt were inappropriate to resolve 
by litigation. l77 Although the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) iden-
tified approximately 17,000 Indian claims, the Departments of In-
terior and Justice rejected almost all as inappropriate for litigation 
and submitted only two legislative proposals to Congress. 178 
On the issue of standing, the government argued that the Indian 
group did not meet the article III requirements because: (1) they 
did not suffer the requisite injury in fact, and (2) there was no 
likelihood that the relief requested would redress any of the Indians' 
claimed injuries. 179 The plaintiffs countered that they had standing 
175 Covelo Indian Community v. Watt, No. 82-2377, 82-2417, slip op. (D.C. Cir. Dec. 21, 
1982) (LEXIS, Genfed library, USAPP file) (per curiam, Scalia, J., dissenting). 
176 Covelo, slip op., majority opinion (referring to 28 U.S.C. § 2415 (1982». 
177 Covelo, slip op., majority opinion. 28 U.S.C. § 2415 imposed a statute of limitations on 
certain actions brought by the United States as plaintiff. The original statute did not specifi-
cally discuss claims brought by the United States, as trustee, on behalf of Indian groups. The 
United States holds the Indians' land in either trust or restricted status and is required to 
bring actions on their behalf in disputes concerning that land. Since concern was expressed 
as to whether the statute involved included suit by the United States in this capacity, Congress 
amended the statute to specifically include Indian claims and to extend the time period for 
filing those actions. In pertinent part, the statute provided that: 
Not later then [December 31, 1982], the Secretary of the Interior, after consultation 
with the Attorney General, shall submit to the Congress legislative proposals to 
resolve those Indian claims subject to the amendments made by the first section of 
this Act that the Secretary of the Interior or the Attorney General believes are not 
appropriate to resolve by litigation. 
28 U.S.C. § 2415. 
178 Covelo, slip op., majority opinion. 
179 Covelo Indian Community v. Watt, 551 F. Supp. 366,379-80 (D. D.C. 1982). 
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under the APA180 to challenge defendant's conduct under the statute 
because the plaintiffs were within the "zone of interests" protected 
by that statute. 181 In affirming the District Court's decision, the 
Court of Appeals agreed that the plaintiffs had standing to enforce 
the statute's mandate requiring the Secretary to submit legislative 
proposals to resolve nonlitigated claims. 182 
The majority in Covelo held that the plaintiffs' injury, the failure 
of the Departments of Justice and Interior to press Indian claims, 
was within the "zone of interests" protected by the statute. 183 The 
court thus held that no bar existed to the plaintiffs' claim based on 
prudential considerations. l84 The court rejected the government's 
article III argument that the plaintiffs had not shown a sufficient 
likelihood of redress for their injury because their only injury was 
failure to receive monetary relief for their claims. 185 Instead, the 
court stated that the plaintiffs had a statutory right to have their 
trustee bring their claims in an appropriate forum, or, in lieu of 
litigation, in the form of a legislative proposal. 186 
The majority held, therefore, that the government's refusal to 
provide assistance deprived the Indian group of a legally cognizable 
right whose connection to final resolution of their underlying damage 
claims was established by Congress. 187 Thus, the Covelo court char-
acterized the case as an example of "the well-established rule that 
when the Constitution or a statute confers procedural rights on 
certain persons, those persons have standing to insist that the gov-
ernment follow proper procedures in reaching a substantive deci-
sion .... "188 In Covelo, the connection between the relief sought and 
180 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982). 
181 Covelo, 551 F. Supp. at 380. 
182 Covelo, slip op., majority opinion. 
183 [d. 
184 The court stated that "[g]iven Congress' direct order to the Secretary to submit legis-
lation, the government's special fiduciary relationship to the Indians, and Congress' purpose 
to resolve the claims justly and equitably, prudential considerations favor finding that appellees 
have standing to enforce the congressional mandate." [d. 
185 [d. 
186 [d. 
187 [d. 
188 [d. The government cited Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 
U.S. 26 (1976), to argue that the deprivation of such a procedural benefit is not connected 
closely enough to the tangible injury to meet the standing requirements. [d. The court rejected 
this argument by narrowly reading Simon to hold only "that unless a plaintiff can show that 
a different substantive result from a government defendant will likely bring about the redress 
of its substantive injury, it has no standing to raise a procedural challenge that may lead to 
that substantive result. " [d. 
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the injury was clear.189 The court found that the statute manifested 
congressional intent that the Department use its knowledge and 
resources to help the Indians resolve their claims. 190 The plaintiffs' 
injury according to the court was the loss of that help and was, 
therefore, redressable by an order requiring the Department to 
submit legislative proposals. 191 
Based on the Supreme Court's then current position on standing, 
the majority's opinion appears to be the proper result. First, the 
Covelo court's liberal reading of the "zone of interests" test is con-
sistent with the Supreme Court's own reading of that test. 192 Second, 
the court also followed the Supreme Court's expansive reading of 
the jw.dicial review provisions of the APA.193 Using such a reading, 
the Covelo court found that the Department of the Interior's failure 
to submit legislative proposals, as they were required to do, was 
sufficient to constitute agency action that aggrieved or adversely 
affected the plaintiffs. 194 Finally, because Congress created a specific 
procedure to benefit plaintiffs, and because that procedure was not 
utilized, the plaintiffs were sufficiently injured for standing purposes 
by being deprived of that statutory right. 195 
Scalia, however, viewed this situation somewhat differently and 
thus dissented from the court's finding of standing. 196 Although his 
dissent presents a logically persuasive argument, the rightness or 
wrongness of his views are not the important issue. What makes 
Scalia's dissent interesting is that it presents almost the same purely 
theoretical view of standing that he presented in his 1983 article on 
the subject of standing. 197 
Scalia began his dissent by stating that "[t]he Constitution permits 
the courts ... to sit in judgment upon the handiwork of the coor-
dinate branches of government only when the 'case or controversy' 
requirements of article III are satisfied. "198 This statement is a clear 
reworking of the idea found in his Separation of Powers article. l99 
189 Covelo, slip op., majority opinion. 
190 [d. (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 2415 (1982». 
191 Covelo, slip op., majority opinion. 
192 See Data Processing Services Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1970). 
193 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982). For an example of this expansive reading, see Data Processing, 
397 U.S. at 153-54. 
194 Covelo, slip op., majority opinion. 
195 See Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153. 
196 Covelo, slip op., dissenting opinion. 
197 See Separation of Powers, supra note 106. 
199 Covelo, slip op., dissenting opinion. 
199 Separation of Powers, supra note 106. 
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In Separation of Powers, Scalia wrote that courts should only "as-
sure the regularity of executive action" as an incidental effect of 
deciding on the rights of individual litigants.2oo Both the article and 
the Covelo dissent view standing functionally as a tool to protect 
separation of powers. Moreover, a deeper analysis of his Covelo 
dissent reveals both a strongly conservative view of standing and 
an almost direct application of his theoretical view of standing to the 
facts of this particular case. 201 
The tone of Scalia's Covelo dissent manifests his strong disagree-
ment with the majority's finding of standing. Scalia's dissent uses 
the phrase "sit in judgment" to criticize the majority's behavior by 
making reference to substantive due process and the rejected role 
of the court as a "superlegislature. "202 Further, Scalia juxtaposes 
this statement with the word "handiwork," which is defined as a 
personal or individual achievement. 203 Here, Scalia seemed to be 
saying that the executive's non-enforcement of the statute requiring 
them to submit legislative proposals was within the executive's dis-
cretion and that the court's action was based merely on a disagree-
ment over the proper policy to follow in Indian claim cases. As such, 
the court, according to Scalia, usurped the executive's proper poli-
cymaking role and thus violated the principles of separation of pow-
ers.204 Such behavior is antithetical to Scalia's philosophy of judicial 
self-restraint. 
The Covelo dissent also reveals Scalia's use of a stricter injury in 
fact standard for establishing standing.205 Scalia's basic thesis in the 
dissent was that there was no injury in the article III sense, because 
the claimed injury was unlikely to be redressed or remedied by the 
relief requested. 206 Scalia, therefore, saw the Indians' inability to 
win on their claims as their only injury.207 Scalia thus did not rec-
ognize any judicially reviewable injury resulting from the Depart-
ment of the Interior's initial refusal to carry out the statutorily 
mandated procedure specifically enacted to benefit the appellees. 208 
200 See id. at 883-84 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803)). 
201 See Covelo, slip op., dissenting opinion. 
202 See Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952). 
203 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1027 (1981). 
204 See Covelo, slip op., dissenting opinion. 
205 See id. 
206 See id. 
207 See id. 
208 See id. Scalia goes on to say in his dissent that the duty imposed on the Department of 
the Interior may itself have been unconstitutional on separation of powers grounds. It seems 
reasonable to argue that either: (1) Scalia transposed the separation of powers infirmities of 
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Instead, he stated that "[n]either on our own authority nor by 
congressional directive may we undertake to adjudicate a claim 
which does not present an injury in fact to the plaintiffs .... "209 For 
Scalia, this situation involved nothing more than keeping the courts 
out of an area involving political discretion. 210 In his critical view, 
the majority "[saw] that important legislative purposes, heralded in 
the halls of Congress, are not lost or misdirected in the vast hallways 
of the federal bureaucracy. "211 In other words, the majority was 
treading where they did not belong. Scalia's Covelo dissent, by 
denying standing to sue concerning an affirmative governmental 
duty, thus established a high threshold for what constitutes injury 
in fact. 
Moreover, Scalia's dissent in Covelo indicates that he was not as 
ready as the majority to find a congressional grant of standing. He 
stated that: "It is enough to note that if Congress can create an 
'injury in fact' by merely saying that a particular class has a 'right' 
to have something done, the case or controversy clause will have 
been transformed from a constitutional imperative to a statutory 
option. "212 Therefore, for Scalia, the injury cannot merely consist of 
the denial of a statutory right. The injury must still meet the stric-
tures of article 111.213 
In his Covelo dissent, Scalia closely adhered to several of his 
theoretical bases. 214 First, he demanded a high level of injury to 
meet the article III requirements. 215 Second, he indicated that courts 
should stay out of what he termed the political discretion involved 
in executive action, even if there was such a showing of inj ury. 216 
Finally, Scalia was not willing to find a congressional conferral of 
standing absent the type of injury that he viewed as essential for 
standing. 217 Covelo thus represents Scalia's strict reading of the 
standing requirements. 
the statute onto the question of standing, or (2) Scalia used standing to dismiss the appeal 
because he did not want to get to the unraised question of the unconstitutionality of the 
statute. Either way, the opinion manifests an early recognition by Scalia of the extra-judicial 
uses of the standing doctrine. See PIERCE, supra note 15, at 143. 
209 Covelo, slip op., dissenting opinion. 
210 See Scalia, Rulemaking as Politics, 34 ADMIN. L. REV. v, v (1982). 
211 Separation of Powers, supra note 106, at 884 (quoting Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating 
Comm., Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1971)). 
212 Covelo, slip op., dissenting opinion. 
213 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
214 See Covelo, slip op., dissenting opinion. 
215 See id.; see Separation of Powers, supra note 106, at 898. 
216 See Covelo, slip op., dissenting opinion; see also Scalia, Rulemaking as Politics, supra 
note 210, at v. 
217 See Covelo, slip op., dissenting opinion; see also Separation of Powers, supra note 106, 
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B. Center for Auto Safety v. Ruckelshaus and Thomas v. New 
York: Justice Scalia's Theory in Environmental Cases 
The standing issue was also present in both of the environmental 
cases for which Scalia wrote opinions while on the Court of Ap-
peals. 218 In these opinions, Scalia could have addressed the reduced 
requirements of injury in fact that had been used in environmental 
litigation. Instead of asserting his stricter requirements for injury 
in fact, however, Scalia adhered to the favored position of environ-
mental litigation. 219 He thus found standing for injuries that were 
insufficient to support standing under his prior analysis. 220 
For example, Scalia's opinion in Center for Auto Safety v. Ruck-
elshaus,221 evidenced a radical departure from his previous view of 
standing. Center for Auto Safety concerned section 207 of the Clean 
Air Act. 222 Section 207 directs the Administrator of the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) to require manufacturer submis-
sion of a plan to remedy nonconformance with maximum emission 
standards. 223 Until this case, the EPA had required and had only 
approved plans that committed auto manufacturers to recall and 
repair nonconforming vehicles.224 
In carrying out section 207, the EPA tested a particular engine 
group of General Motors (GM) automobiles. 225 All the cars exceeded 
the maximum emissions standards, and the EPA ordered GM to 
submit a plan for remedying the nonconformity.226 Instead of sub-
mitting a plan for recall and repair of the 1979 vehicles, GM submit-
ted a plan that proposed engineering the 1982 and 1983 engine 
families to meet a target lower than mandatory emission stan-
dards. 227 GM claimed that this offset plan would achieve emissions 
at 892-93. It must be remembered that Scalia also views injuries which do not place the 
plaintiff within a distinct minority as insufficient to confer standing and thus such parties are 
incapable of invoking judicial protection. Id. at 894-95. 
218 Thomas v. New York, 802 F.2d 1443 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3196 (1987) 
(Scalia, J., took no part in the consideration of the petitions for certiorari); Center for Auto 
Safety v. Ruckelshaus, 747 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
219 See Center for Auto Safety, 747 F.2d at 3 n.2; Thomas, 802 F.2d at 1445-46. See also 
supra text accompanying notes 69-104, for a discussion of standing in environmental litigation. 
220 See Center for Auto Safety, 747 F.2d at 3 n.2; Thomas, 802 F.2d at 1445-46. See also 
supra text accompanying notes 106-172 for a discussion of Justice Scalia's standing theory. 
221 747 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
= See id. at 2. 
223 42 U.S.C. § 7541(c)(1) (1982). 
224 Center for Auto Safety, 747 F.2d at 2. 
225 [d. at 3. 
226 [d. 
227 [d. 
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benefits equal to recall and repair.228 The EPA accepted the plan and 
published a notice of its decision. 229 Center for Auto Safety, two 
other non-profit organizations, and three private individuals peti~ 
tioned the Court of Appeals for review of the EPA's decision.230 The 
petitioners claimed that the EPA's action was unlawful because the 
offset plan did not remedy the nonconformity within the meaning of 
section 207, and that repair and recall was the only acceptable rem-
edy under the statute. 231 
The facts in Center for Auto Safety describe the type of case where 
Scalia had previously criticized other courts for granting standing. 232 
Even if EPA approval of the plan would lead to higher emissions, 
the injury would be of such a widespread nature that it would fail 
to carve out a minority capable of invoking judicial protection. 233 
Further, EPA approval of a plan is the type of agency decision that 
contains a certain amount of political discretion, which is an area 
where, according to Scalia, the courts should not intrude. 234 There-
fore, Center for Auto Safety presents for Scalia the type of situation 
where a court should not be ready to read a congressional conferral 
of standing. 235 
Yet, in his majority opinion, Scalia dismissed the question of stand-
ing in a footnote. 236 He went on to hold that section 207 requires 
recall and repair as the only statutory remedy for nonconformity. 237 
Therefore, he found that the EPA had acted unlawfully in accepting 
GM's offset plan. 238 
228Id. GM's rationale for using this plan was that it would save the company $11.8 million 
and would save 1979 vehicle owners $25.8 million in fuel costs, since the originally proposed 
remedy would have caused increased fuel consumption. Id. 
229Id. (citing Motor Vehicle Recalls under the Clean Air Act, 47 Fed. Reg. 38,189 (1982)). 
230 Center for Auto Safety, 747 F.2d at 3 n.2. Under 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (1982), such 
petitions for review must be filed directly with the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia. 
231 Center for Auto Safety, 747 F.2d at 3. 
232 See id. at 2--4. 
233 See Separation of Powers, supra note 106, at 895-96. 
234 See Scalia, Rulemaking as Politics, supra note 210 at v. Viewing EPA plan approval as 
political discretion is supported by the fact that the approval of state implementation plans 
for conforming to natural air quality standards under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7410 
(1982), is a discretionary act of the administrator and therefore not subject to the Clean Air 
Act's citizen suit provision, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1982). See West Penn Power Co. v. Train, 378 
F. Supp. 941, 944 (W.D. Pa. 1974), afl'd, 522 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 
947 (1976). 
235 See Separation of Powers, supra note 106, at 886. 
236 See Center for Auto Safety, 747 F.2d at 3 n.2. 
237Id. at 6. Scalia admitted that the cited legislative history only indicated what the Ad-
ministrator may do, not what he was required to do. Id. at 5. 
238 Id. at 6. 
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On the question of standing, Scalia relied on United States v. 
Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP).239 
In Center for Auto Safety, he found the petitioners' assertion that 
they are "concerned about, and breathe, pollutants in the ambient 
air" came within the broad grant of standing announced by the 
Supreme Court in SCRAP.240 Scalia's statement in Center for Auto 
Safety on standing thus contrasts sharply with his earlier theoretical 
work and his opinions. 
Scalia had specifically cited SCRAP in his Separation of Powers 
article as an example of where standing had been extended too far. 241 
In fact, Scalia explained in his 1983 article on standing how he 
believes standing should restrict courts to their proper role: 
If I am correct that the doctrine of standing, as applied to 
challenges to governmental action, is an essential means of re-
stricting the courts to their assigned role of protecting minority 
rather than majority interests, several consequences follow. 
First ... it would follow that not all "concrete injury" indirectly 
following from governmental action or inaction would be capable 
of supporting a congressional conferral of standing. One can 
conceive of such a concrete injury so widely shared that a 
congressional specification that the statute at issue was meant 
to preclude precisely that injury would nevertheless not suffice 
to mark out a subgroup of the body politic requiring judicial 
protection. For example, allegedly wrongful governmental action 
that affects "all who breathe." [sic] There is surely no reason to 
believe that an alleged governmental default of such general 
impact would not receive fair consideration in the normal political 
process. 242 
Scalia's opinion in Center for Auto Safety departed from the above 
quoted language. 243 Not only did Scalia's opinion grant standing for 
a group to challenge such a broad action, but he did so by quoting 
language from a case that he specifically criticized in his earlier 
article. 244 
Scalia did not, however, completely abandon his earlier conser-
vative stance in Center for Auto Safety. He did feel compelled to 
bring up the issue in Center for Auto Safety, which may indicate a 
certain concern, if not uneasiness, as to whether standing existed. 245 
239 1 d. at 3 n.2. 
240 ld. 
241 Separation of Powers, supra note 106, at 890. 
242 1 d. at 895-96. 
243 See Center for Auto Safety, 747 F.2d at 3 n.2. 
244 See id.; see also Separation of Powers, supra note 106, at 895-96. 
245 See Center for Auto Safety, 747 F.2d at 3 n.2. 
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Moreover, his use of the phrase, "at least," to explain how plaintiffs' 
fell within the purview of SCRAP may have indicated his doubts as 
to the standing of the nonprofit organizations. 246 Yet, the fact re-
mains that he did find standing, not only for the individuals but for 
the organizations as well. 247 
Scalia's position in Center for Auto Safety represents a radical 
departure from his earlier stated theoretical views in at least two 
ways. First, the ease with which he eliminated the standing issue in 
Center for Auto Safety indicates a judicial readiness to find a congres-
sional grant of standing that Scalia previously criticized. 248 Standing 
to review this type of EPA action is subject to the judicial review 
provisions of the AP A.249 Because there is no language in the Clean 
Air Act that specifically provides review to persons aggrieved or 
adversely affected as the Center for Auto Safety plaintiffs were, 
then Scalia apparently found standing on the basis of the "trans-
morgrified" affirmative grant of standing to parties in fact aggrieved 
"regardless of a lack of legal right or specific statutory language. "250 
Thus in Center for Auto Safety, Scalia followed an interpretation 
that he had criticized earlier as a major cause of the current liber-
alized standing doctrine. 251 
The shift in Scalia's position is also clear from his finding in Center 
for Auto Safety that the breathing of polluted air is a sufficient injury 
in fact to confer standing on the plaintiffs.252 Scalia stated in his 
earlier article that such an injury was one that the courts should not 
recognize because it would receive fair consideration in the majori-
tarian, democratic processes. 253 To be consistent with his own article, 
he thus would have viewed Center for Auto Safety as a case where 
the court should avoid protecting majority rights and refrain from 
finding a congressional designation of a "minority" group that encom-
passes the entire population. 254 Scalia's decision in Center for Auto 
Safety, thus, represents a much different stance from his earlier 
writings. 
246 See id. 
247 See id. 
248 See id.; see also Separation of Powers, supra note 106, at 886. 
249 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982). 
250 See Separation of Powers, supra note 106, at 889 (quoting Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. 
v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1970». 
251 See Separation of Powers, supra note 106, at 889. 
252 See Center for Auto Safety, 747 F.2d at 3 n.2. 
253 Separation of Powers, supra note 106, at 896. 
254 See id. 
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Despite the departure from his stated standing theory, the Center 
for Auto Safety decision does not represent a shift away from the 
basic tenets of Scalia's philosophy of judicial self-restraint. In Center 
for Auto Safety, Scalia was still able to restrict the power of the 
courts by deferring to what he found to be the congressional intent. 255 
The decision also assured that the courts would no longer need to 
make policy decisions concerning proper emission reduction plans by 
finding that Congress had already decided the proper policy to fol-
low. 256 The Center for Auto Safety decision can thus be seen as 
reducing the power of the courts by following the interpretation of 
a coordinate branch of government. 
Nor is Center for Auto Safety an isolated result. Scalia reached a 
similar, if less dramatic, result in Thomas v. New York. 257 The 
Thomas decision is interesting more for what Scalia did not do than 
for what he did. 258 By not addressing certain statutory and consti-
tutional questions, Scalia accepted a much lower injury in fact stan-
dard than his theoretical writings indicated he would be willing to 
do. Further, the injury in Thomas effects the type of majoritarian 
interests that Scalia had earlier indicated were not to be resolved 
by the courts. 259 
Thomas arose from a letter sent by Douglas Costle, then Admin-
istrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, to the Secretary 
of State, Edmund Muskie. 260 In the letter, Costle indicated that acid 
deposition was endangering the United States and Canada and that 
sources in both countries contributed to the problem. 261 The issue 
on appeal in Thomas was whether, under section 115 of the Clean 
Air Act,262 Administrator Costle's letter legally obligated his succes-
sors to identify the states responsible for the acid rain and order 
those states to abate the responsible emissions.263 
255 See Center for Auto Safety, 747 F.2d at 6. 
256 See id. 
257 802 F.2d 1443 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3196 (1987) (Scalia, J., took no 
part in the consideration of the petitions for certiorari). 
258 Id. 
259 See Separation of Powers, supra note 106, at 894-95. 
260 Thomas v. New York, 802 F.2d 443, 1444-45 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 
3196 (1987). 
261 I d. at 1445. 
262 42 U.S.C. § 7415(a) (1982). 
263 This section provides, in pertinent part: 
Whenever the Administrator, upon receipt of reports, surveys or studies from any 
duly constituted international agency has reason to believe that any air pollutant or 
pollutants emitted in the United States cause or contribute to air pollution which 
may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare in a foreign 
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Plaintiffs were several eastern states, national environmental 
groups, American citizens who owned property in eastern Canada, 
and a Congressman. 264 In his decision for the majority, Scalia dis-
missed any question of standing by noting that the plaintiffs were 
suing pursuant to the "citizen suit" provision, section 304, of the 
Clean Air Act.265 Section 304 permits any person to bring a civil 
action "against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of 
the Administrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter 
which is not discretionary with the Administrator. "266 
Scalia's position in Thomas appears to be nothing more than a 
proper deferral to Congress' ability to confer standing. 267 However, 
the issue is not so easily dismissed. Scalia was quite careful to note 
in his article that congressional power is not unlimited; Congress 
cannot extend standing beyond the core article III requirement of 
injury in fact.268 Section 304 is antithetical to Scalia's stated views 
regarding a strict standard of injury in fact. In this light, the relevant 
question is why, in Thomas, Scalia did not address the constitutional 
infirmities of the "citizen suit" provision, or, in lieu of that, limit the 
court's grant of standing to only those who had suffered constitu-
tionally sufficient injury, as he defined such injury in his writings. 269 
Scalia had the ability to raise such issues sui juris because standing 
issues are jurisdictional and must be raised by the court. 270 
There are several explanations why Scalia did not declare the 
citizen suit provision's grant of universal standing unconstitutional. 
Although there is support for the view that an unlimited grant of 
standing is unconstitutional , 271 such a decision runs counter to the 
country . . . the Administrator shall give formal notification thereof to the Governor 
of the State in which such emissions originate. 
42 U.S.C. § 7415(a) (1982). 
264 ThorruLS, 802 F.2d at 1445. 
265Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(2) (1982». 
266 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(2). 
267 ThorruLS, 802 F.2d at 1445-46. 
268 Separation of Powers, supra note 106, at 896. 
269 Id. 
270 See Secretary of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 954 n.4 (1984). Even 
though neither of the parties questioned the state court's conclusion that the plaintiff had 
sustained a sufficient injury to establish standing, the Supreme Court stated that 
"[njevertheless, because the 'case or controversy' requirement is jurisdictional here, we must 
satisfy ourselves that the requirements of Article III are met." See also Regents of University 
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 281 n.14 (1978), where the Court stated: "[pjetitioner does 
not object to Bakke's standing, but inasmuch as this charge concerns our jurisdiction under 
Art. III, it must be considered and rejected." 
271 A number of cases have held that reading the Clean Air Act's "citizen suit" provision as 
granting unlimited standing would be unconstitutional. See Mountain States Legal Found. v. 
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recognized judicial duty to avoid decisions of constitutional ques-
tions. 272 Courts recognize that they should thus avoid possible con-
stitutional issues by giving a questionable statute a construction that 
avoids such problems. 273 This approach is also in keeping with Scalia's 
own policy of judicial self-restraint. 274 
Costle, 630 F.2d 754,767 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1050 (1981); Natural Resources 
Defense Council v. Envtl. Protection Agency, 507 F.2d 905, 908-09 (9th Cir. 1974); Natural 
Resources Defense Council v. Envtl. Protection Agency, 481 F.2d 116, 119-21 (10th Cir. 1973). 
In the earliest of these cases, Natural Resources Defense Council v. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, 481 F.2d at 118-19, Judge Breitenstein reviewed the standing doctrine in 
ruling on the validity of the citizen suit provision. In finding that the section cannot be read 
to grant universal standing, Judge Breitenstein used language quite evocative of Scalia's own 
analysis of standing. 
We further believe that under the doctrine of separation of powers the question of 
the validity and extent [of] congressional authorization is for determination by the 
judicial branch. Otherwise the provisions of Art. III limiting judicial power to cases 
and controversies is thrown into the discard .... Unrestricted litigation by private 
persons to assert their own ideologies under a claim of public interest presents the 
potential of hazardous consequences to our constitutional system based as it is on the 
concept of separation of powers. 
Id. at 120-21. 
Reliance on these cases would have given Scalia a strong opportunity to limit the broad 
grants of standing in environmental litigation that he had consistently criticized. See Sepa-
ration of Powers, supra note 106, at 897; Rulemaking as Politics, supra note 210, at vi. 
Moreover, Scalia discussed such limitations on congressional conferrals of standing in Covelo 
where he stated: "It is enough to note that if Congress can create an 'injury in fact' by merely 
saying that a particular class has a 'right' to have something done, the case or controversy 
clause will have been transformed from a constitutional imperative to a statutory option." 
Covelo, slip op., dissenting opinion. 
Further support for a limited grant of standing is found in McClure v. Carter, 513 F. Supp. 
265, 268-71 (D.C. Idaho 1981), afi'd sub nom. McClure v. Reagan, 454 U.S. 1025 (1981), 
which held that despite a statute purporting to allow any member of Congress to challenge a 
judge's appointment, a senator did not have standing to make such a judicial challenge in 
either his individual or official capacity. Id. at 271. 
An additional argument for eliminating a universal grant of standing would also come from 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803), which stated that "a law repugnant 
to the constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that 
instrument. " Marbury also established that it is the province of the courts to decide the issue 
of constitutionality. Id. at 176. Given Scalia's past reliance on Marbury on the issue of standing, 
such an approach seems natural to expect in Scalia's discussion of the congressional grant of 
standing here. See Separation of Powers, supra note 106, at 883. 
For further discussion of citizen suit provisions, see also Currie, Judicial Review Under 
Federal Pollution Laws, 62 IOWA L. REV. 1221, 1276-79 (1977) (discussing the constitutional 
implications of universal standing provision of the Clean Air Act). 
Professor Berger provides a contrary analysis of the article III issue. See Berger, Standing 
to Sue in Public Actions: Is It a Constitutional Requirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816 (1969). 
Professor Berger uses an historical analysis to refute the notion that standing is grounded in 
requirements of injury in fact and separation of powers. I d. 
272 See Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 568-74 (1947). 
273 See id. at 569. 
274 See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 87 (1986). 
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Consequently, to avoid the constitutional question in Thomas, 
Scalia must have given section 304 a construction that required an 
injury sufficient to meet article III. 275 Such a construction is consis-
tent with that given by the District Court.276 The District Court 
found that litigants suing under section 304 may only vindicate their 
claim if they met the constitutional requirements of article III. 277 
Because the Court of Appeals disposed of the standing question 
in such a cursory manner, it is arguable that Scalia not only accepted 
the lower court's reading of the statute, but also implicitly accepted 
their finding of injury in fact. If this is correct, Scalia accepted a 
finding of standing based on acid deposition, an injury not only 
majoritarian but also an injury whose redressability is questiona-
ble. 278 Even if he did not tacitly accept this theory, Scalia still ac-
cepted a much lower standard of injury in fact than one might have 
thought based on his earlier stated theoretical views. 279 The only 
other possible injury to the plaintiffs was the agency's failure to 
impose a requirement on the states. 280 This is important because 
Scalia had also specifically criticized this type of third party injury 
in his standing article.281 Thus, either possible basis for standing in 
Thomas departs significantly from the strict, nonmajoritarian stance 
Scalia had previously espoused. 
The results of both Center for Auto Safety v. Ruckelshaus and 
Thomas v. New York could lead to the conclusion that Scalia may 
not necessarily impose his strict view of standing onto environmental 
litigation. 282 This conclusion can also be bolstered by Scalia's dis-
senting opinion in Center for Auto Safety v. National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration283 (NHTSA). In NHTSA, the same 
organization as in Ruckelshaus and additional plaintiffs filed a peti-
275 See Thomas, 802 F.2d at 1445-46. 
276 See New York v. Thomas, 613 F. Supp. 1472, 1479-80 (D.D.C. 1985). 
277 See id.; see also Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25, 33 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. 
denied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977); Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 602 F. Supp. 892, 896-97 (N.D. Cal. 
1984); Friends of the Earth v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 419 F. Supp. 528,530 (D.D.C. 1976). 
But see Metropolitan Washington Coalition for Clean Air v. District of Columbia, 511 F.2d 
809, 814 n.26 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (citizens organization had standing to sue under section 304 
without alleging an injury in fact). 
278 See New York v. Thomas, 613 F. Supp. at 1479-81. 
279 See Thomas, 802 F.2d at 1445-46; see also Separation of Powers, supra note 106, at 
881-82. 
280 See Thomas, 802 F.2d at 1446. 
281 See Separation of Powers, supra note 106, at 894. 
282 See supra text accompanying notes 107-72. 
283 See 793 F.2d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also In re Center for Auto 
Safety, 793 F.2d 1346 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (companion case). 
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tion challenging the validity of a National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration rule amending its previously published fuel economy 
standards for light trucks for the 1985 model year, and establishing 
light truck standards for the 1986 model year. 284 Petitioners were 
organizations that worked to promote energy conservation. 285 They 
sought standing as representatives of their members. 286 They alleged 
that their members were injured because of their interest in pur-
chasing the most fuel-efficient vehicles possible.287 
The government countered that the petitioners lacked standing 
because their claims of injury were nothing more than generalized 
grievances shared by many people and were thus insufficient to 
establish standing.288 In characterizing the government's argument 
as "completely misplaced,"289 the majority stated that "[t]he question 
of how many suffer from an injury is logically unrelated to the 
question of whether there is an injury and has nothing to do at all 
with the fitness of a particular party to bring a claim. "290 
In addition, the majority in NHTSA found that the applicable 
statute291 granted review to those adversely affected, and thus re-
moved the court's ability to erect prudential barriers.292 In such 
cases, the court stated, "it matters not one iota if a large number of 
people share the injury and would benefit from its redress. The 
courts may appropriately function as the guardians of majority in-
terests, without weakening the separation of powers, when Congress 
has decided to grant them that role. "293 
284 Center for Auto Safety v. NHTSA, 793 F.2d at 1323. The other groups were Environ-
mental Policy Institute, Public Citizen, and Union of Concerned Scientists. [d. at 1323 n.3. 
285 [d. at 1323. 
286 [d. at 1324. 
287 [d. at 1332. Petitioners base this injury on the following claimed results of the NHTSA's 
action: 
[d. 
NHTSA's low CAFE standards will diminish the types of fuel-efficient vehicles and 
options available. Without the threat of civil penalties, manufacturers will not be 
prodded to install as many fuel-saving devices, nor to install them as promptly. As a 
result, petitioners' members will have less opportunity to purchase fuel-efficient light 
trucks than would otherwise be available to them. In addition, the petitioners urge 
that NHTSA's action sends an instant message that standards will be altered to 
accommodate manufacturers' marketing plans. Such a message can only retard the 
current development of new technologies that would make even greater fuel savings 
possible in the future. 
288 [d. at 1333. 
289 [d. at 1333-34. 
290 [d. at 1334. 
291 15 U.S.C. § 2002(b) (1982). 
292 Center for Auto Safety v. NHTSA, 793 F.2d at 1337. 
293 [d. 
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In his dissent to NHTSA, Scalia characterized the majority opinion 
as violating separation of powers because it was "not judicial vindi-
cation of private rights, but judicial infringement upon the people's 
prerogative to have their elected representatives determine how 
laws that do not bear upon private rights shall be applied. "294 There-
fore, Scalia concluded that the plaintiffs' alleged injury was "of in-
terest only to the society at large, and should be resolved through 
the political mechanisms by which that society acts. There is no basis 
for believing that these plaintiffs have suffered the personal hurt 
that alone justifies judicial interference with the execution of the 
laws."295 In contrast to his environmental opinions, in NHTSA Scalia 
resurrected his earlier strict interpretation of standing as an essen-
tial element of separation of powers, and as a method of restricting 
the courts' power over the other branches of government. 296 Appar-
ently, Scalia was only willing to adopt the liberal view of standing 
where it had been specifically required by Supreme Court prece-
dents. He applied his stricter view of standing, however, to all other 
areas. Scalia thus seemed to be trying to limit the spread of the 
liberal standing doctrine as much as possible. 
V. JUSTICE SCALIA'S IMPACT ON FUTURE ENVIRONMENTAL 
LITIGATION 
Scalia's divergent positions as to standing in environmental cases 
versus non-environmental cases cannot be attributed to merely a 
pro-environmental viewpoint. Such a conclusion is unjustified be-
cause Scalia's record on the Court of Appeals is uneven; he has 
joined with majority panels in decisions that can be viewed as anti-
environmental. 297 The most prominent of these was Thomas v. New 
294 I d. at 1342. 
295 I d. at 1345. 
296 See Separation of Powers, supra note 106, at 894-97. 
297 See California v. Watt, 19 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1281 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Interior De-
partment oil and gas leasing plan does not have to institute a schedule for determining if the 
proposal is consistent with state coastal management plan); Montgomery Envtl. Coalition, 
Inc. v. Envtl. Protection Agency, 19 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (not 
designated for publication) (court lacks jurisdiction to review EPA order allowing a sewage 
treatment plant to discharge higher levels of pollutants than allowed by plant's discharge 
permit). But see Natural Resources Defense Council v. Envtl. Protection Agency, 20 Env't 
Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1264 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (the EPA can consider emissions from dockside 
stationary activities when setting standards under the Clean Air Act for marine terminals); 
Sierra Club v. Peterson, 19 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1705 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Interior Department 
violated NEP A by failing to perform an adequate review of the environmental consequences 
caused by issuing oil and gas leases for two National Forests). 
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York,298 where he held that the EPA's failure to take action con-
cerning acid deposition was unreviewable because Administrator 
Costle's letter to Secretary of State Muskie did not constitute a valid 
rule making because there were no notice-and-comment proce-
dures. 299 
These divergent results indicate that, to properly determine 
whether Scalia will adhere to the lesser showing of injury required 
for standing in environmental litigation, it is necessary first to de-
termine if other factors influenced Scalia's more liberal positions on 
standing in Center for Auto Safety v. Ruckelshaus and Thomas v. 
New York. 300 Moreover, it must also be determined how these factors 
may have influenced the divergent results on the merits, that is, a 
pro-environmental result in Center for Auto Safety301 and an anti-
environmental result in Thomas. 302 The key to understanding these 
apparent inconsistencies seems to lie in the overall jurisprudential 
philosophy that Scalia brings to his decisionmaking. 
A. Factors Influencing Justice Scalia's Decisionmaking 
A realistic assessment of the judicial process must recognize that 
an important component of any judge's decisionmaking is the overall 
jurisprudential philosophy to which that judge adheres. This is es-
pecially true where the case being decided involves no statutory or 
common-law commands that call for a specific result.303 A judge thus 
cannot decide the case merely by reference to the will of the legis-
lature or an agency.304 In such wide open cases, judges are able to 
inject into their decisionmaking value preferences that derive from 
their own jurisprudential philosophy. 
One fertile area for these wide open cases is constitutional law. In 
interpreting the broad phrases of the Constitution, Justices are al-
most compelled to apply their own value preferences. 305 Additionally, 
298 802 F.2d 1443 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
299 [d. at 1446-47 
300 See supra text accompanying notes 218-8l. 
301 See 747 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
302 See 802 F.2d 1443 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
303 See R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 198-207 (1985). 
304 [d. at 206-07. 
305 Felix Frankfurter once wrote that many constitutional concepts were "vague or purposely 
ambiguous" and "that questions of more-or-less, of matters of degree and appraisals of policy 
necessarily come into play and control the controversy." He then stated that: 
Thus, in construing the Constitution in these vital controversies, the Supreme Court 
does not go to a dark room and by a process of nature develop the constitutional 
photographic negative into the picture of its decision. The Court is engaged in a 
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with the rise of decisions that are less and less anchored to the actual 
text of the Constitution, this type of value-laden decisionmaking has 
become even more prevalent. 306 
Both standing and environmental law are such wide open areas. 
Standing, as has been described in this note, has long been an area 
where value-laden decisionmaking has thrived. 307 This value-laden 
decisionmaking has led to a wide range of decisions with very few 
areas that are bound by specific and consistent precedents.308 As for 
environmental law, it can be argued that the pervasive environmen-
tal legislation of the last twenty years predominantly controls envi-
ronmental law. It is important to recognize, however, that Scalia 
believes otherwise. That is, he believes that the recent promotion 
of environmental interests is a direct result of the judiciary's value 
preferences for those interests. 309 Consequently, standing and envi-
ronmental law are sufficiently wide open so that Scalia should be 
able to address his value preferences when deciding such issues that 
come before the Supreme Court. 
Even if standing and environmental law are not viewed as wide 
open, a reasonable analysis of the judicial process recognizes that 
any decision has elements of a judge's personal values. 310 As Judge-
later Justice-Benjamin Cardozo stated, a judge "must balance all 
his ingredients, his philosophy, his logic, his analogies, his history, 
his customs, his sense of right, and all the rest, and adding a little 
here and taking out a little there, must determine, as wisely as he 
creative act-it must exercise judgment. And into the totality of its judgment enters 
the whole of the experience, the imagination, the forecast of the future, the fears 
and hopes, of the members of the Court. 
FELIX FRANKFURTER ON THE SUPREME COURT 336--37 (P. Kurland ed. 1970). 
306 See R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 202 (1985). Just because values enter the deci-
sionmaking does not mean that anything goes. Professor Tribe noted these limitations when 
he observed that his long study of constitutional law had convinced him that "constitutional 
interpretation is a practice alive with choice but laden with content; and that this practice has 
both boundaries and moral significance not wholly reducible to, although never independent 
of, the ends for which it is deployed." L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 4 (1985). 
307 See Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envt'l Study 
Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978). 
308 Environmental law is one of those few areas that seem to follow a specific and identifiable 
trend. In environmental litigation, that trend is toward a more liberal approach to standing 
issues, with only a requirement of very minimal injuries. See supra, text accompanying notes 
69-103. 
309 See Separation of Powers, supra note 106, at 896-97. 
310 See K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 217-22 (1960). Llewellyn was one 
of the leaders of the Legal Realism movement. He described Legal Realism as a method of 
inquiry rather than a philosophy. The only tenet of the method is to look at the legal process 
from a fresh perspective to see how it really works. Id. at 510. 
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can, which weight shall tip the scales."311 Therefore, even in cases 
where there is very little room for judicial maneuvering, judges will, 
in some part, inject their own values into their decisionmaking. If 
nothing else, judges, being only human, will necessarily interpret 
facts based on their own world views. The relevant inquiry in ana-
lyzing Scalia thus becomes one of determining the jurisprudential 
philosophy that he will bring to his decisionmaking on the Supreme 
Court. 
Scalia's overarching philosophy is judicial self-restraint.312 The 
prime goal of this philosophy is a reduction in the perceived over-
judicialization of government. 313 A self-restrained judge will thus 
seek to limit judicial power over other governmental institutions by 
paying greater deference to congressional and administrative deci-
sions. 314 This deference can be achieved either by deferring on the 
actual merits of the case315 or by invoking stricter standards for 
judicial review, as Scalia suggests in his 1983 article on standing. 316 
By starting from the premise that Scalia will approach cases from 
the perspective of judicial self-restraint, it will be possible to return 
to an analysis of Scalia's Court of Appeals decisions to explain their 
results and to determine what effect Scalia may have on environ-
mental litigation. 
B. Judicial Restraint Analysis of Justice Scalia's Decisionmaking 
One reason for supposing that an inquiry into Scalia's value pref-
erences will help explain his opinions and will yield reliable predic-
tions of his future position on environmental issues lies in a recog-
nition that Scalia has already used the standing doctrine as a method 
to dispose of the merits of particular cases. In other words, Scalia 
has allowed his view of the merits to dictate his conclusions as to 
whether the standing requirements have been met. 317 
This type of value-laden decisionmaking provides a reasonable 
explanation, in part, for the lack of concern that Scalia expressed 
311 B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 162 (1921). 
312 See Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, The D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978 
SUP. CT. REV. 345, 382; Chief Justice Burger to Retire From Supreme Court; Reagan 
Nominates Rehnquist as Successor, Scalia to Fill Vacancy, 17 Env't Rep. (BNA) at 217 
(June 6, 1986). 
313 R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 208 (1985). 
314 Id. 
315 See Center for Auto Safety v. Ruckelshaus, 747 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
316 See Separation of Powers, supra note 106. 
317 See L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 100 (1985). 
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for the standing problems in Center for Auto Safety v. Ruckel-
shaus. 318 By strictly enforcing what he asserted was the legislative 
mandate, Scalia was able to promote his own preference for judicial 
self-restraint by deferring to congressional intent319 and by encour-
aging more specific legislative delegations to agencies.320 In addition, 
by mandating that the only proper remedy was recall and repair, 321 
Scalia was ensuring that the EPA would only approve such plans 
and thus ensuring that the courts would no longer be asked to decide 
this policy issue. Center for Auto Safety consequently restricted the 
courts' power. Such values bind the particular agency, as well as the 
court, and place policy making power in the most majoritarian gov-
ernmental body. For these reasons, it is possible that in Center for 
Auto Safety Scalia was willing to subvert his otherwise strict view 
of the standing requirements. Arriving at a "pro-environmental" 
decision can thus be seen as incidental to Scalia; in Center for Auto 
Safety it was merely a byproduct of achieving the goals of his judicial 
agenda. 
Avoiding application of strict standing requirements in Center for 
Auto Safety also made sense from a practical standpoint. Scalia was 
faced with a specific precedent-SCRAP-which granted standing 
for an injury to the air the plaintiffs breathed. 322 Consequently, it 
would have been quite difficult for Scalia to distinguish the injury in 
Center for Auto Safety from the injury in SCRAP. Moreover, even 
if he were successful in such a task, he faced a great likelihood of 
being overturned if the Supreme Court granted certiorari. The de-
cision in Center for Auto Safety can thus be explained on both 
practical and theoretical levels. 
The same value preferences and judicial practicalities also help 
explain the result of Thomas v. New York. 323 Thomas can be viewed 
as a value-laden decision because Scalia lessened his requirements 
of standing to address directly the underlying issue of the role the 
court should play in what he viewed as an act of political discretion, 
that is, the agency's failure to take action on acid deposition.324 
318 See 747 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1984). See supra text accompanying notes 221-56. 
319 See Center for Auto Safety, 747 F.2d at 5. 
320 See id. at 5-6; 1976 Bicentennial Institute-Oversight and Review of Agency Decision-
making, 28 ADMIN. L. REV. 569, 694-95, 701 (1976). 
321 Center for Auto Safety, 747 F.2d at 6. 
322 United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 
U.S. 669, 687 (1973). 
323 802 F.2d 1443 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
324 See id. at 1448; Rulemaking as Politics, supra note 210, at v. 
1987] JUSTICE SCALIA 177 
Because dispensing of Thomas on standing requirements would have 
been adverse to the congressional intent of the "citizen suit" provi-
sion of the Clean Air Act,325 such a decision would have faced a 
strong likelihood of reversal. By finding in Thomas that Administra-
tor Costle's letter was an unreviewable act, Scalia was still able to 
restrict the courts' power in relation to the other branches of gov-
ernment and thus promote his judicial agenda. 
The results in the non-environmental cases, Covelo326 and Center 
for Auto Safety v. NHTSA,327 can also be explained by reference to 
both Scalia's theoretical views and the practicalities of judicial de-
cisionmaking. In these cases, Scalia could more easily assert his 
preferences for reducing the judiciary's power by restricting access 
to it. He was not faced with specifically applicable precedents lib-
erally granting standing as he was in the environmental area. Scalia 
could thus pick and choose among the widely divergent standing 
cases to find support for his strict standing interpretation.328 Con-
sequently, it was the confused nature of the standing doctrine that 
allowed Scalia to strictly construe standing in Covelo and Center for 
Auto Safety v. NHTSA. 
The results of these cases indicate a number of possibilities for 
standing in future environmental litigation and for environmental 
litigation in general. Although Scalia was willing to defer to the 
liberal grants of standing accorded to environmental litigation, it 
seems possible that such deference could change on the Supreme 
Court. Appellate courts have a dual function of correcting error and 
of setting forth principles of law to guide the lower courtS. 329 Al-
though some have argued that intermediate appellate courts do, and 
should, have a major lawmaking function,330 Scalia has said that 
intermediate appellate courts should take a more restricted approach 
to making new law. 331 Such constraints may not occur on the Su-
325 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(2) (1982). 
326 No. 82-2377, 82-2417, slip op. (D.C. Cir. Dec. 21, 1982) (LEXIS, Genfed library, USAPP 
file) (per curiam, Scalia, J., dissenting). See supra text accompanying notes 175-217. 
327 793 F.2d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1986). See supra text accompanying notes 283-96. 
328 Among the cases Scalia cites in Covelo are Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 
426 U.S. 26 (1976), and Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). In Center for Auto Safety v. 
NHTSA, Scalia relied on such strict standing cases as Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 
(1983). 
329 Leonard, The Correctness Function of Appellate Decision-Making: Judicial Obligation 
in an Era of Fragmentation, 17 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 299, 302 (1984). 
330 See Grey, Intermediate Judicial Creativity, TRIAL, April, 1985, at 26; Kaplan, Do Inter-
mediate Appellate Courts Have a Lawmaking Function?, 70 MASS. L. REV. 10 (1985). 
331 See Vermont Yankee: The APA, The D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, supra note 
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preme Court since the pull of precedent will be much weaker there 
than on the Court of Appeals. This view is further bolstered by the 
fact that most adherents of judicial self-restraint consider deference 
to precedent as a completely separate phenomenon, unrelated to the 
goals of self-restraint. 332 Their exclusivity seems correct because the 
proponents of judicial self-restraint see their goal as reducing the 
judiciary's power in relation to the other branches of government 
and not in relation to activist courts of the past. 333 
Consequently, Scalia may push for his stricter standing require-
ments in environmental litigation. It is difficult to determine whether 
he will be able to garner enough support to carry out his views. 334 
"\\J1at seems more certain is that Scalia will likely advocate a de-
crease in what he views as the Supreme Court's promotion of envi-
ronmental interests based on the Justices' own socioeconomic prej-
udices. 335 Therefore, if Scalia is unable to get the votes necessary to 
restrict judicial review by tightening up the standing requirements, 
he may still try to defer to decisions made by Congress or the 
agencies as he did in Center for Auto Safety v. Ruckelshaus. 336 
This approach does not necessarily doom all environmental inter-
ests. Strict adherence to a self-restrained judicial approach will also 
produce some pro-environmental decisions if such policies are clearly 
enunciated by Congress and the current administration. 337 It may 
thus ultimately be the future political importance of environmental 
issues that dictates Justice Scalia's positions in environmental cases. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The divergent results of Scalia's Court of Appeals decisions on 
standing make it somewhat unlikely that on the Supreme Court 
312, at 359-75 (criticizing the lower court's role in the creation of hybrid rulemaking proce-
dures). 
332 See R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 210 (1985). 
333 I d. at 208. 
334 In Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 740 (1984), Justice O'Connor wrote an opinion joined 
by Burger, C.J., and White, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., denying standing to a group that 
sought to have IRS standards for denying tax exempt status to racially discriminatory private 
schools changed. In arriving at that holding, the Supreme Court stated that standing require-
ments must be interpreted by reference to separation of powers principles. Id. at 752. 
Professor Nichol sees the Court's emphasis on separation of powers principles as possibly 
portending a major restriction on judicial access in order to achieve deference to the other 
branches of government. Nichol, Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U. 
PA. L. REV. 635, 636 (1985). This analysis suggests that Scalia may have some support for 
his standing theories. 
335 See Separation of Powers, supra note 106, at 896-97. 
336 See 747 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1984). See supra text accompanying notes 221-54. 
337 See R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 208-09 (1985). 
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Scalia will advocate a hard and fast rule of standing inimical to 
environmental interests. That same divergence, however, indicates 
that Scalia is willing to let his view of the merits dictate the result 
of the standing question. Thus, based on his past decisions, when 
not bound by specific congressional or administrative directives, 
Scalia will most likely seek to promote the philosophy of judicial self-
restraint by cutting back the Court's potentially powerful role in 
promoting the environmental agenda. 
